---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/sprag-cli/v/3.124.2"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/sprag-cli/v/3.124.2.md"
package: "sprag-cli"
report_status: "published"
title: "sprag-cli@3.124.2 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "3.124.2"
---

# sprag-cli@3.124.2 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk
- **Selected version:** 3.124.2
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The install hook can automatically register Sprag hooks and integrations in user-level agent settings, so this warrants a warning under the agent extension lifecycle rule. The inspected feedback and team-sync paths are user-triggered or require team enrollment; they do not establish a separate attack.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 86.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-13T06:59:40.965Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-13T07:01:05.218Z
- **Download time:** 510 ms
- **Static scan time:** 2942 ms
- **AI review time:** 80799 ms
- **Total time:** 84253 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Automatic package setup registers Sprag integrations in the user's agent configuration.

- **Trigger:** Package installation in an eligible context, including a global npm install; other package managers are not reliably scope-gated.

- **Impact:** Agent settings are changed and Sprag commands can run on later agent events without a separate install command.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, bin/postinstall.js, src/postinstall.js, src/commands/install.js, src/installer.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-13T07:01:05.218Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The postinstall hook launches sprag install, which installs Sprag hooks and integrations by default. The SessionStart hook writes to the Claude user settings file.

- **Rationale:** The install hook can automatically register Sprag hooks and integrations in user-level agent settings, so this warrants a warning under the agent extension lifecycle rule. The inspected feedback and team-sync paths are user-triggered or require team enrollment; they do not establish a separate attack.

- **Files touched:** claudeUserDir()/settings.json

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 86.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Unknown

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** The manifest runs bin/postinstall.js during package installation., Eligible postinstall contexts launch the CLI's install command; the install runs automatically unless --manual is supplied., installAll registers Sprag hooks and other integrations, including a SessionStart hook in the user's Claude settings file., The hook installer writes to claudeUserDir()/settings.json, outside the package directory.

- **Evidence against:** The postinstall gate skips CI and non-global npm installs; other package managers may run it unless CI or SPRAG\_POSTINSTALL=0 is set., The installed hooks and integrations are Sprag features, so the behavior fits the warning category for automatic setup of the package's own agent extension., The feedback network request requires the user to run the feedback command with a message; team sync requires team membership.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to sprag-cli@3.124.2.

- Review the evidence and your use of sprag-cli@3.124.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node bin/postinstall.js || true
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node bin/postinstall.js || true
```

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** bin/postinstall.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/bin/postinstall.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L7: 
L8: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
L9: import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
```

### 5. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** src/statusline-base.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/statusline-base.js>)

Package source references shell execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L34: const r = process.platform === 'win32'
L35: ? spawnSync(cmd, { ...opts, shell: true })
L36: : spawnSync('/bin/sh', ['-c', cmd], opts);
```

### 6. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** src/doc2md.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/doc2md.cjs>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L24: 
L25: const fs = require('node:fs');
L26: const os = require('node:os');
```

### 7. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** src/request-store.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/request-store.js>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L89: try {
L90: store = JSON.parse(readFileSync(storePathFor(filePath), 'utf8'));
L91: } catch (e) {
```

### 8. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 9. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 10. Medium: Install Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** src/codex/panel-shell.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/codex/panel-shell.js>)

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L34: 
L35: export function installPanelShell({ file = join(process.env.ZDOTDIR || homedir(), '.zshrc'), remove = false } = {}) {
L36: const text = existsSync(file) ? readFileSync(file, 'utf8') : '';
```

### 11. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 12. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** src/commands/feedback.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/commands/feedback.js>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L57: if (auth.status !== 0) return null;
L58: const res = spawnSync('gh', ['issue', 'create', '-R', REPO, '--title', title, '--body', body],
L59: { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 30_000 });
L60: if (res.status !== 0) { debug('feedback:gh', res.stderr); return null; }
L61: const url = String(res.stdout).trim().split('\n').pop();
...
L69: try {
L70: const params = new URLSearchParams();
L71: params.set(FORM.message, `${title}\n\n${body}`);
L72: params.set(FORM.meta, meta);
L73: const res = await fetch(`https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/${FORM.id}/formResponse`, {
L74: method: 'POST',
```

### 13. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** src/commands/feedback.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/commands/feedback.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L21: 
L22: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
L23: import { writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
...
L29: const REPO = 'rootstudioyaml/sprag';
L30: const ISSUES_URL = `https://github.com/${REPO}/issues`;
L31: 
...
L48: `version: ${version}`,
L49: `os: ${process.platform} ${os.release()}`,
L50: `node: ${process.version}`,
...
L59: { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 30_000 });
L60: if (res.status !== 0) { debug('feedback:gh', res.stderr); return null; }
L61: const url = String(res.stdout).trim().split('\n').pop();
```

### 14. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** src/commands/feedback.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/commands/feedback.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> bin/cli.js -> src/commands/feedback.js
L57: if (auth.status !== 0) return null;
L58: const res = spawnSync('gh', ['issue', 'create', '-R', REPO, '--title', title, '--body', body],
L59: { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 30_000 });
L60: if (res.status !== 0) { debug('feedback:gh', res.stderr); return null; }
L61: const url = String(res.stdout).trim().split('\n').pop();
...
L69: try {
L70: const params = new URLSearchParams();
L71: params.set(FORM.message, `${title}\n\n${body}`);
L72: params.set(FORM.meta, meta);
L73: const res = await fetch(`https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/${FORM.id}/formResponse`, {
L74: method: 'POST',
```

### 15. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** src/codex/panel-shell.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/codex/panel-shell.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> bin/cli.js -> src/commands/codex.js -> src/codex/panel-shell.js
L34: 
L35: export function installPanelShell({ file = join(process.env.ZDOTDIR || homedir(), '.zshrc'), remove = false } = {}) {
L36: const text = existsSync(file) ? readFileSync(file, 'utf8') : '';
```

### 16. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 17. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 18. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** examples/statusline-command.ps1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/examples/statusline-command.ps1>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = examples/statusline-command.ps1
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 1918
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 19. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 20. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 95.0%
- **Path:** src/team-sync.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/team-sync.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = token_shingles
matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.124.0
matchedPath = src/team-sync.js
matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.124.0
similarity = 1.000
shingleOverlap = 48
summary = source token shingles overlapped finalized malicious source
```

### 21. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** src/codex/panel-setup.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/codex/panel-setup.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.124.0
matchedPath = src/codex/panel-setup.js
matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.124.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 22. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** src/commands/team.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/commands/team.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.124.0
matchedPath = src/commands/team.js
matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.124.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 23. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** src/doc2md.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/doc2md.cjs>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.124.0
matchedPath = src/doc2md.cjs
matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.124.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 24. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** src/korean-style.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/korean-style.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.124.0
matchedPath = src/korean-style.js
matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.124.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 25. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** src/oauth-budget.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/oauth-budget.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.124.0
matchedPath = src/oauth-budget.js
matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.124.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 26. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** src/update-check.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/update-check.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.124.0
matchedPath = src/update-check.js
matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.124.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 27. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** src/codex/budget.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/codex/budget.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.124.0
matchedPath = src/codex/budget.js
matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.124.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 28. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** src/commands/install.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/commands/install.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.124.0
matchedPath = src/commands/install.js
matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.124.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 29. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** src/gateway-auth.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/gateway-auth.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.124.0
matchedPath = src/gateway-auth.js
matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.124.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 30. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** src/litellm-budget.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/litellm-budget.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.124.0
matchedPath = src/litellm-budget.js
matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.124.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 31. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** src/codex/delegation-diagnostics.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sprag-cli@3.124.2/src/codex/delegation-diagnostics.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.124.0
matchedPath = src/codex/delegation-diagnostics.js
matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.124.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall
- **Dependencies:** 1
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 1

### Published dependency entries
- smol-toml ^1.9.1 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** sprag-cli
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 3.124.2
- **License:** Apache-2.0
- **Version published:** 2026-11-13T06:56:07.926Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-09-13T13:50:23.117Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-22T14:19:08.859Z
- **Known versions:** 107
- **Latest version:** 3.135.1
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** The delegation layer for Claude Code and Codex: each task goes to the model and effort that fits it, down to cheaper models for lookups and up to higher effort when a cheaper run would miss, backed by public replay cases, with a live statusline and team r
- **Deprecated:** This version is no longer supported. Please upgrade: npm i -g sprag-cli@latest
- **Author:** DeepPulse
- **Maintainers:** root.studio.yaml
- **Keywords:** claude-code, claude, anthropic, codex, token-usage, token-saver, reduce-tokens, cost-savings, claude-code-cost, claude-code-statusline, statusline, model-routing
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20
- **Artifact files:** 212
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 2,336,063 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/sprag-cli/v/3.124.2>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/rootstudioyaml/sprag>)
- [Homepage](<https://sprag.io/>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/rootstudioyaml/sprag/issues>)
