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sprag-cli@3.50.1: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / sprag-cli / 3.50.1

sprag-cli@3.50.1

Sprag - a quality ratchet harness for AI coding agents: model-fitting delegation, ratchet rules, doc2md, Korean style gate. Same tool as claude-token-saver, under its new name.

AI Security Review

scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Npm postinstall adds agent instructions to the global Claude control surface without obtaining consent. The instructions apply across projects and import package-managed rules.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Installing the package with npm lifecycle scripts enabled when no harness block exists and CTS_NO_HARNESS is not 1.

Impact

Changes the instructions and rule imports used by Claude across projects without installation-time consent.

Mechanism

Postinstall invokes the installer, disables prompting, defaults to approval, and writes a harness block into the global Claude instruction file.

Policy narrative

The npm postinstall lifecycle invokes the install command. Prompt eligibility explicitly rejects postinstall, while harness setup defaults to proceeding and calls global initialization. That initialization appends or creates a global Claude instruction block and seeds imported rule files. Preserving existing content and providing an environment-variable opt-out do not establish consent for changing instructions across all projects.

AI rationale

The inspected lifecycle performs unconsented mutation of a broad AI-agent instruction surface, meeting the specified blocking policy. The concrete global instruction write establishes the verdict independently of citation coverage limits.

Evidence

package.jsonbin/cli.jssrc/prompt.jssrc/commands/install.jssrc/harness.jssrc/harness-templates.js~/.claude/CLAUDE.md

Source & flagged code

19 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/cli.js install || true

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/cli.js install || true

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

src/doc2md.cjsView file

28const crypto = require('node:crypto'); L29: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require('node:child_process'); L30: const ledger = require('./doc2md-ledger.cjs');

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

src/doc2md.cjsView on unpkg · L28

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.53.0 matchedPath = src/doc2md.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.53.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/doc2md.cjsView on unpkg

24L25: const fs = require('node:fs'); L26: const os = require('node:os');

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

src/doc2md.cjsView on unpkg · L24

src/fig2md.cjsView file

31// `0.4.x` rather than `^0.4.1` on purpose: the Windows install goes through L32: // cmd.exe, where `^` is the escape character and would be eaten before npm L33: // ever saw it. The range is the same one caret means for a 0.x package.

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

src/fig2md.cjsView on unpkg · L31

src/seed-rules.jsView file

54try { L55: const data = JSON.parse(readFileSync(seedStatePath(), 'utf8')); L56: return data && typeof data.decided === 'object' && data.decided ? data : { decided: {} };

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

src/seed-rules.jsView on unpkg · L54

src/commands/feedback.jsView file

56if (auth.status !== 0) return null; L57: const res = spawnSync('gh', ['issue', 'create', '-R', REPO, '--title', title, '--body', body], L58: { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 30_000 }); L59: if (res.status !== 0) { debug('feedback:gh', res.stderr); return null; } L60: const url = String(res.stdout).trim().split('\n').pop(); ... L67: try { L68: const params = new URLSearchParams(); L69: params.set(FORM.message, `${title}\n\n${body}`); L70: params.set(FORM.meta, meta); L71: const res = await fetch(`https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/${FORM.id}/formResponse`, { L72: method: 'POST',

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

src/commands/feedback.jsView on unpkg · L56

21L22: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L23: import { writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs'; ... L28: const REPO = 'rootstudioyaml/sprag'; L29: const ISSUES_URL = `https://github.com/${REPO}/issues`; L30: ... L47: `version: ${version}`, L48: `os: ${process.platform} ${os.release()}`, L49: `node: ${process.version}`, ... L58: { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 30_000 }); L59: if (res.status !== 0) { debug('feedback:gh', res.stderr); return null; } L60: const url = String(res.stdout).trim().split('\n').pop();

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

src/commands/feedback.jsView on unpkg · L21

56Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.postinstall -> bin/cli.js -> src/commands/feedback.js L56: if (auth.status !== 0) return null; L57: const res = spawnSync('gh', ['issue', 'create', '-R', REPO, '--title', title, '--body', body], L58: { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 30_000 }); L59: if (res.status !== 0) { debug('feedback:gh', res.stderr); return null; } L60: const url = String(res.stdout).trim().split('\n').pop(); ... L67: try { L68: const params = new URLSearchParams(); L69: params.set(FORM.message, `${title}\n\n${body}`); L70: params.set(FORM.meta, meta); L71: const res = await fetch(`https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/${FORM.id}/formResponse`, { L72: method: 'POST',

bin/cli.jsView file

10Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface: L109: sprag uninstall remove everything install added L110: sprag harness check score the harness setup in CLAUDE.md L111: sprag harness analyze run the harness transcript analysis manually ... L256: L257: // Subcommand: harness — manage the project's CLAUDE.md harness rules. L258: // sprag harness init # write CLAUDE.md (5 sections) + ratchet.md L259: // sprag harness uninit # remove harness block from CLAUDE.md (backup kept) L260: // sprag harness check # show 🅷 N/5 + which sections are missing ... L271: // sprag compact-window # status L272: // sprag compact-window set --global # pin 200k (~/.claude/settings.json) L273: // sprag compact-window set --p

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

bin/cli.jsView on unpkg · L10

examples/statusline-command.ps1View file

•path = examples/statusline-command.ps1 kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 1918 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

examples/statusline-command.ps1View on unpkg

src/advice.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 4

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

src/advice.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

src/korean-style.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.53.0 matchedPath = src/korean-style.js matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.53.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/korean-style.jsView on unpkg

src/update-check.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = claude-token-saver@3.50.0 matchedPath = src/update-check.js matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xhdWRlLXRva2VuLXNhdmVy:3.50.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/update-check.jsView on unpkg

src/gateway-auth.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.53.0 matchedPath = src/gateway-auth.js matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.53.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/gateway-auth.jsView on unpkg

src/litellm-budget.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.53.0 matchedPath = src/litellm-budget.js matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.53.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/litellm-budget.jsView on unpkg

src/model-alias.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.53.0 matchedPath = src/model-alias.js matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.53.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/model-alias.jsView on unpkg