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squeez@1.48.18: Malicious npm security report (Block) | LPM Firewall

registry / squeez / 1.48.18

squeez@1.48.18

Hook-based token compressor for Claude Code, Copilot CLI, and OpenCode. Compresses bash output up to 95%, collapses redundant calls, injects caveman persona.

AI Security Review

scanned 1h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The automatic npm postinstall runs an unpinned remote shell installer and then configures Claude Code hooks. This creates an install-time remote code execution path and mutates an AI-agent control surface.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Installing the package through npm on Unix, or invoking its CLI when the native binary is missing.

Impact

Remote script code can run during installation, and the setup command changes Claude Code hook configuration.

Mechanism

install.js pipes a script from raw.githubusercontent.com to sh, then invokes the downloaded binary's setup command; bin.js has the same remote installer fallback.

Attack narrative

The postinstall lifecycle automatically runs install.js. On Unix, it fetches a shell script from raw.githubusercontent.com and executes it with sh, then runs the downloaded binary's setup command to register Claude Code hooks. bin.js repeats the remote shell execution when the binary is absent.

AI rationale

The package has an automatic postinstall that executes remote shell content and proceeds to mutate Claude Code hook configuration. This is a concrete install-time attack surface, so the package warrants blocking.

Evidence

package.jsoninstall.jsbin.js

Network endpoints1

raw.githubusercontent.com/claudioemmanuel/squeez/main/install.sh

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

10 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node install.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node install.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin.jsView file

7*/ L8: const { execFileSync, execSync } = require('child_process'); L9: const fs = require('fs');

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin.jsView on unpkg · L7

7*/ L8: const { execFileSync, execSync } = require('child_process'); L9: const fs = require('fs'); ... L13: const BINARY = path.join( L14: os.homedir(), '.claude', 'squeez', 'bin', L15: process.platform === 'win32' ? 'squeez.exe' : 'squeez' L16: ); ... L18: if (!fs.existsSync(BINARY)) { L19: process.stderr.write('squeez: binary not found — running installer...\n'); L20: if (process.platform === 'win32') { L21: process.stderr.write('squeez: on Windows, download from https://github.[redacted]\n'); L22: process.exit(1);

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

bin.jsView on unpkg · L7

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = squeez@1.46.4 matchedPath = bin.js matchedIdentity = npm:c3F1ZWV6:1.46.4 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = e5e3d144990d97e1 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = squeez@1.46.4 matchedPath = bin.js matchedIdentity = npm:c3F1ZWV6:1.46.4 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 2 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

bin.jsView on unpkg

7*/ L8: const { execFileSync, execSync } = require('child_process'); L9: const fs = require('fs');

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin.jsView on unpkg · L7

install.jsView file

15L16: const INSTALL_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), '.claude', 'squeez'); L17: const BINARY = path.join(INSTALL_DIR, 'bin', process.platform === 'win32' ? 'squeez.exe' : 'squeez'); ... L92: L93: fs.mkdirSync(path.join(INSTALL_DIR, 'bin'), { recursive: true }); L94: fs.mkdirSync(path.join(INSTALL_DIR, 'hooks'), { recursive: true }); L95: fs.mkdirSync(path.join(INSTALL_DIR, 'sessions'), { recursive: true }); L96: ... L118: warn(`squeez setup failed: ${err.message}`); L119: warn('run manually: ~/.claude/squeez/bin/squeez setup'); L120: }

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

install.jsView on unpkg · L15

6*/ L7: const { execSync } = require('child_process'); L8: const https = require('https'); L9: const fs = require('fs'); ... L13: // Allow skipping (e.g. in CI that only needs the npm package metadata) L14: if (process.env.SQUEEZ_SKIP_INSTALL === '1') process.exit(0); L15:

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

install.jsView on unpkg · L6

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = squeez@1.46.4 matchedPath = install.js matchedIdentity = npm:c3F1ZWV6:1.46.4 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

install.js