AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo confirmed malicious attack surface. The flagged primitives implement a user-invoked development/server CLI and local application loader.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
User runs `srvx` or imports the package to serve/load their own server entry.
Impact
No unconsented persistence, exfiltration, remote payload execution, or install-time behavior was identified.
Mechanism
Loads local server modules, serves HTTP requests, and optionally fetches a user-supplied URL.
Rationale
The static signals are package-aligned: this is a universal server CLI that loads a local application entry, serves requests, and supports explicit fetch operations. Source inspection found no lifecycle hook or concrete malicious behavior.
Evidence
package.jsonbin/srvx.mjsdist/cli.mjsdist/loader.mjsREADME.md
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 96.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
Evidence against
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- bin/srvx.mjs only invokes the documented CLI entrypoint.
- dist/loader.mjs dynamically imports a user-selected/local server entry.
- dist/cli.mjs forks its own bin for runtime flags, not a shell command.
- Network fetch is an explicit `srvx fetch` user command or server runtime behavior.
- No package code writes files, harvests credentials, or targets AI-agent config.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
WildcardDependency
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcedist/cli.mjsView file
4import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L5: import { fork } from "node:child_process";
L6: import { createReadStream, existsSync, statSync } from "node:fs";
High
372async function forkCLI(args, runtimeArgs) {
L373: const child = fork(fileURLToPath(globalThis.__SRVX_BIN__ || new URL("../bin/srvx.mjs", import.meta.url)), [...args], { execArgv: [...process.execArgv, ...runtimeArgs].filter(Boolea...
L374: child.on("error", (error) => {
High
4Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/cli.mjs spawns dist/loader.mjs; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L4: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L5: import { fork } from "node:child_process";
L6: import { createReadStream, existsSync, statSync } from "node:fs";
...
L11: try {
L12: if (!process.env.NODE_ENV) process.env.NODE_ENV = cliOpts.prod ? "production" : "development";
L13: let server;
...
L90: }
L91: async function cliFetch(cliOpts) {
L92: const stdin = cliOpts.stdin || process.stdin;
L93: const stdout = cliOpts.stdout || process.stdout;
L94: const stderr = cliOpts.stderr || process.stderr;
...
L103: if (cliOpts.verbose && loaded.url) {
High
Cross File Remote Execution Context
Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.
dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L4dist/loader.mjsView file
41if (opts.interceptHttpListen !== false) {
L42: const loaded = await interceptListen(() => import(url), opts);
L43: mod = loaded.res;
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/loader.mjsView on unpkg · L41Findings
3 High4 Medium4 Low
HighChild Processdist/cli.mjs
HighShelldist/cli.mjs
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/cli.mjs
MediumDynamic Requiredist/loader.mjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumWildcard Dependency
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings