AI Security Review
scanned 51m ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo confirmed malicious attack surface is established. Runtime network access is limited to the explicit user-invoked fetch/curl mode or application server behavior.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
User runs the srvx CLI or imports its server adapters.
Impact
No install-time execution, persistence, credential collection, or unsolicited network destination was found.
Mechanism
Local server-entry loading, HTTP serving, and explicit fetch client operation.
Rationale
Scanner signals map to normal server-framework capabilities: an explicit HTTP client command, local entry-module loading, and a self-fork for development runtime flags. Source inspection found no concrete malicious chain.
Evidence
package.jsonbin/srvx.mjsdist/cli.mjsdist/loader.mjsdist/static.mjs
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 97.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
Evidence against
- package.json has no preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle hook.
- bin/srvx.mjs only invokes the packaged CLI entrypoint.
- dist/cli.mjs forks its own bin only for CLI watch/import execution.
- dist/loader.mjs dynamically imports an explicit or discovered local server entry.
- Remote fetch is an explicit srvx fetch/curl user command; no fixed endpoint exists.
- No package writes, credential harvesting, exfiltration, or AI-agent config access found.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcedist/cli.mjsView file
4import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L5: import { fork } from "node:child_process";
L6: import { createReadStream, existsSync, statSync } from "node:fs";
High
372async function forkCLI(args, runtimeArgs) {
L373: const child = fork(fileURLToPath(globalThis.__SRVX_BIN__ || new URL("../bin/srvx.mjs", import.meta.url)), [...args], { execArgv: [...process.execArgv, ...runtimeArgs].filter(Boolea...
L374: child.on("error", (error) => {
High
4Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/cli.mjs spawns dist/loader.mjs; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L4: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L5: import { fork } from "node:child_process";
L6: import { createReadStream, existsSync, statSync } from "node:fs";
...
L11: try {
L12: if (!process.env.NODE_ENV) process.env.NODE_ENV = cliOpts.prod ? "production" : "development";
L13: let server;
...
L90: }
L91: async function cliFetch(cliOpts) {
L92: const stdin = cliOpts.stdin || process.stdin;
L93: const stdout = cliOpts.stdout || process.stdout;
L94: const stderr = cliOpts.stderr || process.stderr;
...
L103: if (cliOpts.verbose && loaded.url) {
High
Cross File Remote Execution Context
Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.
dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L4dist/loader.mjsView file
41if (opts.interceptHttpListen !== false) {
L42: const loaded = await interceptListen(() => import(url), opts);
L43: mod = loaded.res;
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/loader.mjsView on unpkg · L41Findings
3 High3 Medium4 Low
HighChild Processdist/cli.mjs
HighShelldist/cli.mjs
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/cli.mjs
MediumDynamic Requiredist/loader.mjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings