superclawd@0.1.105
Claude Code, supercharged — your team's standards, every session. The superclawd CLI loads your workspace's skills, agents, commands, workflows, and live directives into Claude Code as a plugin.
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package’s disclosed memory feature has opt-out controls, but its default session hooks process transcript text and tool data automatically, a broader data flow than the README clearly explains. This is a privacy concern warranting a warning rather than a malware block.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
During a SuperClawd-launched Claude session, on Stop or SessionEnd when capture is enabled and a repository fingerprint is present.
Impact
Session content may be processed beyond what the README’s general AI-captured memory description makes clear, creating a privacy risk.
Mechanism
The helper reads and condenses transcript text, tool inputs, and tool results; it sends the digest to a Claude CLI process for memory extraction and posts resulting memories to the SuperClawd API.
AI rationale
The package’s disclosed memory feature has opt-out controls, but its default session hooks process transcript text and tool data automatically, a broader data flow than the README clearly explains. This is a privacy concern warranting a warning rather than a malware block.
Evidence
dist/index.jsdist/hook-helper.mjsREADME.md.superclawd/capture.lock
Network endpoints1
mcp-api.superclawd.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 86.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The launcher adds automatic capture hooks for session stop and end when capture is enabled and a repository fingerprint is available.
- The capture helper reads the session transcript, including user and assistant text, tool inputs, and tool results.
- At session end, the helper sends a condensed transcript to a Claude CLI process for memory extraction, then posts generated memories to the SuperClawd API.
- The README describes AI-captured memories and provides `--no-capture` and a Private Memory setting, but does not explain that session transcript content is processed automatically.
Evidence against
- The manifest has no install hook; `prepublishOnly` only builds the package.
- The capture behavior supports the package’s stated cross-session memory feature and has opt-out controls.
- The helper posts extracted memory records to the package’s own API, not a hard-coded unrelated receiver.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
Source & flagged code
13 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
2Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L2: import { createRequire as __cr } from 'module'; const require = __cr(import.meta.url);
L3: var Xe=["opus","fable","sonnet","haiku"],Un={opus:"claude-opus-5-5",fable:"claude-fable-5-1",sonnet:"claude-sonnet-5-5",haiku:"claude-haiku-5-5"},Wn=/^claude-(opus|fable|sonnet|hai...
L4: `,{mode:384});try{Bn(se,384)}catch{}}function nt(){return L()?.preferences?.sk[redacted]===!0}function qn(){return L()?.preferences?.notifications===!0}function rt(){return L()?...
L5: `)}catch{}}function ct(e,t,n=!1){et(lt(e))||Jn(e,{notifications:n?!1:qn(),...t?{workspace:t}:{}})}function ut(){et(se)||Y({credentials:{keyId:"",secret:"",workspace:""},preferences...
L6: `)};function Vn(){try{switch(process.platform){case"darwin":return
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L22import { createRequire as __cr } from 'module'; const require = __cr(import.meta.url);
L3: var Xe=["opus","fable","sonnet","haiku"],Un={opus:"claude-opus-5-5",fable:"claude-fable-5-1",sonnet:"claude-sonnet-5-5",haiku:"claude-haiku-5-5"},Wn=/^claude-(opus|fable|sonnet|hai...
L4: `,{mode:384});try{Bn(se,384)}catch{}}function nt(){return L()?.preferences?.sk[redacted]===!0}function qn(){return L()?.preferences?.notifications===!0}function rt(){return L()?...
High
Findings
1 Critical11 High3 Medium7 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShelldist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/hook-helper.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/hook-helper.mjs
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/index.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/mcp-server.mjs
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to superclawd@0.1.105.
See all versions of superclawd for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of superclawd@0.1.105 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.