registry / superclawd / 0.1.15
superclawd@0.1.15
Claude Code, supercharged — your team's standards, every session. The superclawd CLI loads your workspace's skills, agents, commands, workflows, and live directives into Claude Code as a plugin.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package is not concretely malicious under the install-control-surface policy, but it creates a persistent Git hook and captures agent-session material during normal runtime. That warrants a warning for agent-extension lifecycle and data-handling risk.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
User runs authenticated superclawd in a Git repository.
Impact
Repository/session content can be sent to the vendor backend and a user-repository hook persists after the CLI exits.
Mechanism
Claude plugin hook setup, session capture, and backend API calls.
AI rationale
The package is not concretely malicious under the install-control-surface policy, but it creates a persistent Git hook and captures agent-session material during normal runtime. That warrants a warning for agent-extension lifecycle and data-handling risk.
Evidence
package.jsondist/index.jsdist/hook-helper.mjsdist/mcp-server.mjs~/.superclawd/config.json~/.superclawd/sessions.git/hooks/post-commit
Network endpoints2
mcp-api.superclawd.comapi.superclawd.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- dist/index.js: user CLI run writes a .git/hooks/post-commit hook.
- dist/index.js: generated Claude plugin enables SessionEnd/Stop capture hooks unless disabled.
- dist/hook-helper.mjs: authenticated helper sends prompt/memory data to SuperClawd APIs.
- dist/index.js: runtime fetches a server-provided workspace catalog and writes plugin content.
Evidence against
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- All observed mutation and network activity follows an explicit superclawd CLI invocation.
- Endpoints and credentials are consistently SuperClawd service configuration; no covert third-party receiver found.
- The post-commit hook is marked, replace-safe, and source says it is safe to delete.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
2Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L2: import { createRequire as __cr } from 'module'; const require = __cr(import.meta.url);
L3: import{spawn as fn,spawnSync as zr,execSync as Qr}from"node:child_process";import{fileURLToPath as dn}from"node:url";import{existsSync as mn}from"node:fs";import{resolve as Zr,dirn...
L4: `,{mode:384});try{kn(ee,384)}catch{}}function Ye(){return A()?.preferences?.sk[redacted]===!0}function En(){return A()?.preferences?.notifications===!0}function Be(){return A()?...
L5: `)}catch{}}function ze(e,t,n=!1){Fe(Xe(e))||Cn(e,{notifications:n?!1:En(),...t?{workspace:t}:{}})}function Qe(){Fe(ee)||G({credentials:{keyId:"",secret:"",workspace:""},preferences...
L6: `)};function Rn(){try{switch(process.platform){case"darwin":return
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L22import { createRequire as __cr } from 'module'; const require = __cr(import.meta.url);
L3: import{spawn as fn,spawnSync as zr,execSync as Qr}from"node:child_process";import{fileURLToPath as dn}from"node:url";import{existsSync as mn}from"node:fs";import{resolve as Zr,dirn...
L4: `,{mode:384});try{kn(ee,384)}catch{}}function Ye(){return A()?.preferences?.sk[redacted]===!0}function En(){return A()?.preferences?.notifications===!0}function Be(){return A()?...
High
Findings
1 Critical5 High3 Medium7 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowEvaldist/mcp-server.mjs
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to superclawd@0.1.15.
See all versions of superclawd for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of superclawd@0.1.15 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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