registry / superclawd / 0.1.26
superclawd@0.1.26
Claude Code, supercharged — your team's standards, every session. The superclawd CLI loads your workspace's skills, agents, commands, workflows, and live directives into Claude Code as a plugin.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource confirms a user-invoked Claude Code extension that persists a scoped Git hook and sends derived session/repository content to its own backend. It is not malicious under the install-control-surface boundary, but warrants warning for its broad agent lifecycle and data-capture capability.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
User runs `superclawd` in a repository after authenticating.
Impact
Workspace content and durable repository facts may be sent to the SuperClawd service; a post-commit hook persists in the repository.
Mechanism
Claude extension lifecycle setup with transcript/diff-derived remote memory capture.
AI rationale
Source confirms a user-invoked Claude Code extension that persists a scoped Git hook and sends derived session/repository content to its own backend. It is not malicious under the install-control-surface boundary, but warrants warning for its broad agent lifecycle and data-capture capability.
Evidence
package.jsondist/index.jsdist/hook-helper.mjsREADME.md~/.superclawd/config.json~/.superclawd/sessions/<id>/plugin<git-hooks-dir>/post-commit
Network endpoints2
mcp-api.superclawd.comapi.superclawd.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- dist/index.js creates Claude plugin hooks during `superclawd` execution.
- dist/index.js installs/updates a project `.git/hooks/post-commit` hook when launched in a Git repo.
- dist/hook-helper.mjs reads Claude transcripts and Git diffs, then posts derived memories.
- Remote directives, guardrails, and MCP configuration are fetched from SuperClawd endpoints.
Evidence against
- package.json has no npm install/preinstall/postinstall hook.
- All observed writes and hook setup follow an explicit `superclawd` CLI launch.
- Endpoints are SuperClawd service endpoints consistent with the package purpose.
- No hidden foreign-agent mutation, credential theft endpoint, or remote payload execution was confirmed.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
2Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L2: import { createRequire as __cr } from 'module'; const require = __cr(import.meta.url);
L3: import{spawn as fn,spawnSync as zr,execSync as Qr}from"node:child_process";import{fileURLToPath as dn}from"node:url";import{existsSync as mn}from"node:fs";import{resolve as Zr,dirn...
L4: `,{mode:384});try{kn(ee,384)}catch{}}function Ye(){return A()?.preferences?.sk[redacted]===!0}function En(){return A()?.preferences?.notifications===!0}function Be(){return A()?...
L5: `)}catch{}}function ze(e,t,n=!1){Fe(Xe(e))||Cn(e,{notifications:n?!1:En(),...t?{workspace:t}:{}})}function Qe(){Fe(ee)||G({credentials:{keyId:"",secret:"",workspace:""},preferences...
L6: `)};function Rn(){try{switch(process.platform){case"darwin":return
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L22import { createRequire as __cr } from 'module'; const require = __cr(import.meta.url);
L3: import{spawn as fn,spawnSync as zr,execSync as Qr}from"node:child_process";import{fileURLToPath as dn}from"node:url";import{existsSync as mn}from"node:fs";import{resolve as Zr,dirn...
L4: `,{mode:384});try{kn(ee,384)}catch{}}function Ye(){return A()?.preferences?.sk[redacted]===!0}function En(){return A()?.preferences?.notifications===!0}function Be(){return A()?...
High
Findings
1 Critical5 High3 Medium7 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowEvaldist/mcp-server.mjs
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to superclawd@0.1.26.
See all versions of superclawd for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of superclawd@0.1.26 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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