registry / superclawd / 0.1.35
superclawd@0.1.35
Claude Code, supercharged — your team's standards, every session. The superclawd CLI loads your workspace's skills, agents, commands, workflows, and live directives into Claude Code as a plugin.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is not concrete malicious npm-install behavior, but its explicit CLI path installs persistent Git/Claude lifecycle hooks and transmits captured workspace-memory content. Warn so users can assess the continuing agent and repository control surface.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
User runs superclawd in a Git repository and later uses Claude sessions or commits.
Impact
Repository workflow and Claude-session content can be processed and persisted remotely under workspace credentials.
Mechanism
CLI-installed Git/Claude hooks capture session and commit-derived memory metadata, then call the authenticated SuperClawd API.
AI rationale
This is not concrete malicious npm-install behavior, but its explicit CLI path installs persistent Git/Claude lifecycle hooks and transmits captured workspace-memory content. Warn so users can assess the continuing agent and repository control surface.
Evidence
package.jsondist/index.jsdist/hook-helper.mjsREADME.md.git/hooks/post-commit
Network endpoints2
mcp-api.superclawd.comapi.superclawd.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- On explicit CLI use in a Git repo, writes an executable post-commit hook that runs in the background.
- Claude session hooks capture condensed user, assistant, tool-input, and tool-result transcript content.
- Captured memory operations are sent to the package’s authenticated MCP API.
Evidence against
- No npm preinstall/install/postinstall hook; the sole lifecycle hook is prepublishOnly.
- The control-surface changes occur only after the user runs the CLI, and an existing non-SuperClawd post-commit hook is preserved.
- Endpoints and behavior align with the documented workspace-memory and Claude-plugin product.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
2Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L2: import { createRequire as __cr } from 'module'; const require = __cr(import.meta.url);
L3: import{spawn as fn,spawnSync as zr,execSync as Qr}from"node:child_process";import{fileURLToPath as dn}from"node:url";import{existsSync as mn}from"node:fs";import{resolve as Zr,dirn...
L4: `,{mode:384});try{kn(ee,384)}catch{}}function Ye(){return A()?.preferences?.sk[redacted]===!0}function En(){return A()?.preferences?.notifications===!0}function Be(){return A()?...
L5: `)}catch{}}function ze(e,t,n=!1){Fe(Xe(e))||Cn(e,{notifications:n?!1:En(),...t?{workspace:t}:{}})}function Qe(){Fe(ee)||G({credentials:{keyId:"",secret:"",workspace:""},preferences...
L6: `)};function Rn(){try{switch(process.platform){case"darwin":return
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L22import { createRequire as __cr } from 'module'; const require = __cr(import.meta.url);
L3: import{spawn as fn,spawnSync as zr,execSync as Qr}from"node:child_process";import{fileURLToPath as dn}from"node:url";import{existsSync as mn}from"node:fs";import{resolve as Zr,dirn...
L4: `,{mode:384});try{kn(ee,384)}catch{}}function Ye(){return A()?.preferences?.sk[redacted]===!0}function En(){return A()?.preferences?.notifications===!0}function Be(){return A()?...
High
Findings
1 Critical5 High3 Medium7 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowEvaldist/mcp-server.mjs
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to superclawd@0.1.35.
See all versions of superclawd for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of superclawd@0.1.35 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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