superclawd@0.1.52
Claude Code, supercharged — your team's standards, every session. The superclawd CLI loads your workspace's skills, agents, commands, workflows, and live directives into Claude Code as a plugin.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo malicious install-time behavior, covert payload, or foreign broad agent-control mutation was found. The automatic hooks and project Git-hook mutation remain a meaningful first-party agent-extension lifecycle risk.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- A user-run CLI session installs Stop and SessionEnd capture hooks by default when repo memory is enabled.
- The CLI attempts to install a project `.git/hooks/post-commit` helper after launching setup.
- The helper sends transcript/diff-derived memory content to the SuperClawd backend.
- The manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- Behavior requires an explicit `superclawd` command plus authenticated workspace context.
- Transcript and diff analysis invokes the locally installed `claude` CLI; no hidden remote payload execution was found.
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedSource sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to superclawd@0.1.52.
See all versions of superclawd for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of superclawd@0.1.52 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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