registry / superclawd / 0.1.61
superclawd@0.1.61
Claude Code, supercharged — your team's standards, every session. The superclawd CLI loads your workspace's skills, agents, commands, workflows, and live directives into Claude Code as a plugin.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has a real agent-extension lifecycle and transcript-derived memory capability, so it merits a warning. Source inspection found no install-time execution or concrete malicious chain that justifies blocking publication.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
The user runs the superclawd CLI in a project after authenticating to a workspace.
Impact
User prompts, assistant output, and limited tool data can influence or be retained as workspace, repository, agent, or private memory; a post-commit hook may also be added.
Mechanism
Claude hooks capture transcript-derived memory and send it to the authenticated service.
AI rationale
The package has a real agent-extension lifecycle and transcript-derived memory capability, so it merits a warning. Source inspection found no install-time execution or concrete malicious chain that justifies blocking publication.
Evidence
package.jsonREADME.mddist/index.jsdist/hook-helper.mjs.git/hooks/post-commit
Network endpoints2
mcp-api.superclawd.comapi.superclawd.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 84.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The user-run CLI generates Claude Code hook definitions for session, tool, and stop events.
- The hook helper reads Claude transcripts, including user and assistant messages and tool data, for memory capture.
- Captured memory records are sent with configured credentials to the SuperClawd API.
- A CLI launch can install a project post-commit hook, while preserving a different existing hook.
Evidence against
- The manifest has no install, preinstall, or postinstall script; its only lifecycle script builds before publishing.
- The README discloses the Claude plugin, memory capture, and post-commit behavior as product features.
- Network use is directed to configured SuperClawd service endpoints and requires workspace credentials.
- No hidden binary loading, destructive deletion, or unconsented install-time agent-control mutation was found.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
2Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L2: import { createRequire as __cr } from 'module'; const require = __cr(import.meta.url);
L3: import{spawn as fn,spawnSync as zr,execSync as Qr}from"node:child_process";import{fileURLToPath as dn}from"node:url";import{existsSync as mn}from"node:fs";import{resolve as Zr,dirn...
L4: `,{mode:384});try{kn(ee,384)}catch{}}function Ye(){return A()?.preferences?.sk[redacted]===!0}function En(){return A()?.preferences?.notifications===!0}function Be(){return A()?...
L5: `)}catch{}}function ze(e,t,n=!1){Fe(Xe(e))||Cn(e,{notifications:n?!1:En(),...t?{workspace:t}:{}})}function Qe(){Fe(ee)||G({credentials:{keyId:"",secret:"",workspace:""},preferences...
L6: `)};function Rn(){try{switch(process.platform){case"darwin":return
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L22import { createRequire as __cr } from 'module'; const require = __cr(import.meta.url);
L3: import{spawn as fn,spawnSync as zr,execSync as Qr}from"node:child_process";import{fileURLToPath as dn}from"node:url";import{existsSync as mn}from"node:fs";import{resolve as Zr,dirn...
L4: `,{mode:384});try{kn(ee,384)}catch{}}function Ye(){return A()?.preferences?.sk[redacted]===!0}function En(){return A()?.preferences?.notifications===!0}function Be(){return A()?...
High
Findings
1 Critical5 High3 Medium7 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowEvaldist/mcp-server.mjs
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to superclawd@0.1.61.
See all versions of superclawd for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of superclawd@0.1.61 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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