--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/superclawd/v/0.1.63" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/superclawd/v/0.1.63.md" package: "superclawd" report_status: "published" title: "superclawd@0.1.63 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.1.63" --- # superclawd@0.1.63 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as AI-agent capability risk** — Allowed by default with warning: agent-facing configuration or capability changes need review before use. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only AI-agent capability risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** AI-agent capability abuse - **Selected version:** 0.1.63 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. This is a user-invoked AI-agent extension with broad hooks and remote data handling, so it warrants a warning. Static inspection found no install-time trigger, self-dependency chain, or concrete covert malware behavior. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 87.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-30T19:19:58.941Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-30T19:20:57.653Z - **Download time:** 502 ms - **Static scan time:** 870 ms - **AI review time:** 57339 ms - **Total time:** 58712 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Running the superclawd CLI creates and launches a Claude Code plugin with hooks. Those hooks can inspect session transcript paths, query SuperClawd's API, and create a Git post-commit hook. - **Trigger:** A user runs the superclawd command after installation. - **Impact:** The package can influence Claude Code sessions and transmit prompt-derived data to the vendor service; this is a meaningful agent-control and privacy risk, but not an automatic npm-install attack. - **Evidence paths:** dist/index.js, dist/hook-helper.mjs - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-30T19:20:57.653Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** User-invoked Claude Code plugin and hook installation with remote memory retrieval. - **Rationale:** This is a user-invoked AI-agent extension with broad hooks and remote data handling, so it warrants a warning. Static inspection found no install-time trigger, self-dependency chain, or concrete covert malware behavior. - **Files touched:** .claude-plugin/plugin.json, hooks/hooks.json, hooks/agent-map.json, .git/hooks/post-commit - **Network endpoints:** https://mcp-api.superclawd.com, https://api.superclawd.com ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 87.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The CLI generates a Claude Code plugin containing managed commands, skills, MCP configuration, and hook definitions., The generated hooks capture session and agent transcript paths, start detached background processing, and use the configured SuperClawd API., The helper sends prompt text or file paths to the SuperClawd memory-search endpoint during Claude Code hooks., It attempts to install a post-commit hook in the current Git repository when the user runs the CLI. - **Evidence against:** package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall script; prepublishOnly only builds before publication., The package behavior is reached through the superclawd CLI, not automatically on npm installation., The remote endpoints and plugin functionality are consistent with the named SuperClawd service., The manifest has no runtime dependency on another release of superclawd. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to superclawd@0.1.63. - Review the evidence and your use of superclawd@0.1.63 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L2: import { createRequire as __cr } from 'module'; const require = __cr(import.meta.url); L3: import{spawn as fn,spawnSync as zr,execSync as Qr}from"node:child_process";import{fileURLToPath as dn}from"node:url";import{existsSync as mn}from"node:fs";import{resolve as Zr,dirn... L4: `,{mode:384});try{kn(ee,384)}catch{}}function Ye(){return A()?.preferences?.sk[redacted]===!0}function En(){return A()?.preferences?.notifications===!0}function Be(){return A()?... ``` ### 4. Low: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 45.0% - **Path:** dist/mcp-server.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L5: || (${i} === "string" && ${o} && ${o} == +${o} && !(${o} % 1))`).assign(a,(0,L._)`+${o}`);return;case"boolean":n.elseIf((0,L._)`${o} === "false" || ${o} === 0 || ${o} === null`).as... L6: || ${i} === "boolean" || ${o} === null`).assign(a,(0,L._)`[${o}]`)}}}function tw({gen:t,parentData:e,parentDataProperty:r},n){t.if((0,L._)`${e} !== undefined`,()=>t.assign((0,L._)`... L7: missingProperty: ${n}, ``` ### 5. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 6. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 7. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 8. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L2: import { createRequire as __cr } from 'module'; const require = __cr(import.meta.url); L3: import{spawn as fn,spawnSync as zr,execSync as Qr}from"node:child_process";import{fileURLToPath as dn}from"node:url";import{existsSync as mn}from"node:fs";import{resolve as Zr,dirn... L4: `,{mode:384});try{kn(ee,384)}catch{}}function Ye(){return A()?.preferences?.sk[redacted]===!0}function En(){return A()?.preferences?.notifications===!0}function Be(){return A()?... ``` ### 9. Critical: Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L2: import { createRequire as __cr } from 'module'; const require = __cr(import.meta.url); L3: import{spawn as fn,spawnSync as zr,execSync as Qr}from"node:child_process";import{fileURLToPath as dn}from"node:url";import{existsSync as mn}from"node:fs";import{resolve as Zr,dirn... L4: `,{mode:384});try{kn(ee,384)}catch{}}function Ye(){return A()?.preferences?.sk[redacted]===!0}function En(){return A()?.preferences?.notifications===!0}function Be(){return A()?... L5: `)}catch{}}function ze(e,t,n=!1){Fe(Xe(e))||Cn(e,{notifications:n?!1:En(),...t?{workspace:t}:{}})}function Qe(){Fe(ee)||G({credentials:{keyId:"",secret:"",workspace:""},preferences... L6: `)};function Rn(){try{switch(process.platform){case"darwin":return ``` ### 10. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L2: import { createRequire as __cr } from 'module'; const require = __cr(import.meta.url); L3: import{spawn as fn,spawnSync as zr,execSync as Qr}from"node:child_process";import{fileURLToPath as dn}from"node:url";import{existsSync as mn}from"node:fs";import{resolve as Zr,dirn... L4: `,{mode:384});try{kn(ee,384)}catch{}}function Ye(){return A()?.preferences?.sk[redacted]===!0}function En(){return A()?.preferences?.notifications===!0}function Be(){return A()?... L5: `)}catch{}}function ze(e,t,n=!1){Fe(Xe(e))||Cn(e,{notifications:n?!1:En(),...t?{workspace:t}:{}})}function Qe(){Fe(ee)||G({credentials:{keyId:"",secret:"",workspace:""},preferences... L6: `)};function Rn(){try{switch(process.platform){case"darwin":return ye("caffeinate",["-i","-w",String(process.pid)],{stdio:"ignore"});case"linux" ``` ### 11. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L2: import { createRequire as __cr } from 'module'; const require = __cr(import.meta.url); L3: import{spawn as fn,spawnSync as zr,execSync as Qr}from"node:child_process";import{fileURLToPath as dn}from"node:url";import{existsSync as mn}from"node:fs";import{resolve as Zr,dirn... L4: `,{mode:384});try{kn(ee,384)}catch{}}function Ye(){return A()?.preferences?.sk[redacted]===!0}function En(){return A()?.preferences?.notifications===!0}function Be(){return A()?... L5: `)}catch{}}function ze(e,t,n=!1){Fe(Xe(e))||Cn(e,{notifications:n?!1:En(),...t?{workspace:t}:{}})}function Qe(){Fe(ee)||G({credentials:{keyId:"",secret:"",workspace:""},preferences... L6: `)};function Rn(){try{switch(process.platform){case"darwin":return ye("caffeinate",["-i","-w",String(process.pid)],{stdio:"ignore"});case"linux" ``` ### 12. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js L2: import { createRequire as __cr } from 'module'; const require = __cr(import.meta.url); L3: import{spawn as fn,spawnSync as zr,execSync as Qr}from"node:child_process";import{fileURLToPath as dn}from"node:url";import{existsSync as mn}from"node:fs";import{resolve as Zr,dirn... L4: `,{mode:384});try{kn(ee,384)}catch{}}function Ye(){return A()?.preferences?.sk[redacted]===!0}function En(){return A()?.preferences?.notifications===!0}function Be(){return A()?... L5: `)}catch{}}function ze(e,t,n=!1){Fe(Xe(e))||Cn(e,{notifications:n?!1:En(),...t?{workspace:t}:{}})}function Qe(){Fe(ee)||G({credentials:{keyId:"",secret:"",workspace:""},preferences... L6: `)};function Rn(){try{switch(process.platform){case"darwin": ``` ### 13. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 14. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 15. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 16. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ### 17. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/hook-helper.mjs\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2 ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 2 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 11 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 2 ### Published dependency entries - @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.7.0 (Dependency) - zod ^3.24.2 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** superclawd - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.1.63 - **License:** SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE - **Version published:** 2026-08-30T18:33:58.001Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-11T02:51:31.449Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-05T00:18:16.536Z - **Known versions:** 86 - **Latest version:** 0.1.120 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Claude Code, supercharged — your team's standards, every session. The superclawd CLI loads your workspace's skills, agents, commands, workflows, and live directives into Claude Code as a plugin. - **Author:** SuperClawd - **Maintainers:** sharpcomputing - **Keywords:** superclawd, claude-code, claude, plugin, skills, agents, mcp, ai-assistant, coding-standards, model-context-protocol - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20 - **Artifact files:** 6 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 494,092 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()