superclawd@0.1.91
Claude Code, supercharged — your team's standards, every session. The superclawd CLI loads your workspace's skills, agents, commands, workflows, and live directives into Claude Code as a plugin.
AI Security Review
scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source confirms authenticated requests can send saved credentials to an unrestricted SUPERCLAWD_MCP_API_URL override, warranting a warning for conditional exposure. The first-party default and absence of evidence that an alternate endpoint was used do not establish malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The CLI obtains credentials through browser-approved device authorization and then saves them locally.
- The MCP API defaults to SuperClawd’s service, but SUPERCLAWD_MCP_API_URL can replace that destination.
- The runtime forwards saved credentials in authentication headers to requests using the configurable MCP API URL, without checking the destination against an allowlist.
- The inspected CLI locations show the login and normal command dispatch paths; they do not establish that an alternate endpoint was configured.
- The inspected default destination is the package’s first-party MCP service, and the source does not show credentials sent to an unrelated fixed recipient.
Source & flagged code
9 flaggedSource sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to superclawd@0.1.91.
See all versions of superclawd for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of superclawd@0.1.91 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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