---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/sysverify/v/2.0.9"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/sysverify/v/2.0.9.md"
package: "sysverify"
report_status: "published"
title: "sysverify@2.0.9 npm security report"
verdict: "malicious"
version: "2.0.9"
---

# sysverify@2.0.9 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked & quarantined** — Foreground screen content and extracted text can be disclosed to the remote AI service while the overlay is designed to evade observation.

- **Verdict:** Malicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Block
- **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Data Exfiltration
- **Selected version:** 2.0.9
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

Trusted malware advisory MAL-2026-16404 identifies this version as malicious. Firewall keeps the version blocked under its trusted-intelligence policy. An AI recommendation to allow or warn does not override that advisory.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

A user-started launcher creates a concealed, persistent Electron overlay. The application captures foreground content and sends queued content to an external AI endpoint.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 98.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-21T23:59:49.469Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-22T00:01:05.258Z
- **Download time:** 510 ms
- **Static scan time:** 175 ms
- **AI review time:** 75104 ms
- **Total time:** 75789 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** A user-started launcher creates a concealed, persistent Electron overlay. The application captures foreground content and sends queued content to an external AI endpoint.

- **Trigger:** Running the package command starts the launcher; global hotkeys trigger text or image capture and submission.

- **Impact:** Foreground screen content and extracted text can be disclosed to the remote AI service while the overlay is designed to evade observation.

- **Evidence paths:** bin/kalamasha-tool.js, main.js, bin/stealth\_capture.ps1

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-22T00:01:05.258Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The launcher copies and detaches a renamed Electron binary, respawns it after exit, and the app uses capture-exclusion settings plus foreground screen capture before posting queued data.

- **Attack narrative:** When launched, the package detaches a renamed Electron process and restarts it after termination. Its overlay is excluded from capture, while hotkeys can collect foreground text or a foreground screenshot. The queued content is submitted to api.groq.com for AI answers. This is a concealed data-capture and persistence mechanism, not the diagnostic utility claimed by the manifest.

- **Rationale:** The source implements stealth, watchdog persistence, foreground capture, and external submission as one active workflow. Although installation itself does not activate the launcher, the concrete behavior is malicious when the package command is run.

- **Files touched:** bin/kalamasha-tool.js, main.js, bin/stealth\_capture.ps1

- **Network endpoints:** api.groq.com

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 98.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Malware

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for block:** The package command starts its custom launcher., The launcher copies Electron under a deceptive name and respawns its detached child after exit., The application marks its overlay as excluded from screen capture., It captures the foreground screen, packages captured images or text, and posts them to Groq.

- **Evidence against:** The postinstall hook only attempts to resolve Electron and does not start the launcher.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to sysverify@2.0.9.

- Avoid installing sysverify@2.0.9. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sysverify@2.0.9/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node -e "try{require('electron')}catch(e){console.log('Electron will download on first run.')}"
```

### 2. Critical: Red Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 95.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sysverify@2.0.9/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node -e "try{require('electron')}catch(e){console.log('Electron will download on first run.')}"
```

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** bin/kalamasha-tool.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sysverify@2.0.9/bin/kalamasha-tool.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: 
L3: const { spawn, execSync } = require('child_process');
L4: const path = require('path');
```

### 5. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** main.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sysverify@2.0.9/main.js>)

Package source references shell execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L456: // STRATEGY: Spawn a NEW electron process on the target desktop
L457: // via CreateProcessW (PowerShell helper). Parent stays alive and goes dormant.
L458:
```

### 6. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 7. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 8. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 9. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 72.0%
- **Path:** bin/kalamasha-tool.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sysverify@2.0.9/bin/kalamasha-tool.js>)

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Cross-file remote execution chain: bin/kalamasha-tool.js spawns main.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L2: 
L3: const { spawn, execSync } = require('child_process');
L4: const path = require('path');
...
L10: 
L11: const rootDir = path.resolve(__dirname, '..');
L12: const mainPath = path.resolve(rootDir, 'main.js');
L13: const appDataDir = path.join(process.env.LOCALAPPDATA, 'Microsoft', 'Windows', 'Diagnostics');
L14: const bootLog = path.join(appDataDir, 'boot.log');
```

### 10. High: Runtime Package Install
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 86.0%
- **Path:** bin/kalamasha-tool.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sysverify@2.0.9/bin/kalamasha-tool.js>)

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L66: try {
L67: execSync('npm install ' + missing.join(' ') + ' --no-save', {
L68: cwd: rootDir,
```

### 11. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 12. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 13. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** bin/chrome\_cookies.ps1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sysverify@2.0.9/bin/chrome_cookies.ps1>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = bin/chrome_cookies.ps1
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 11705
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 14. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** bin/kalamasha-tool.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/sysverify@2.0.9/bin/kalamasha-tool.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = moidevl@1.0.0
matchedPath = bin/kalamasha-tool.js
matchedIdentity = npm:bW9pZGV2bA:1.0.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall
- **Dependencies:** 3
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 3

### Published dependency entries
- electron ^25.6.0 (Dependency)
- koffi ^2.15.6 (Dependency)
- uiohook-napi ^1.5.5 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** sysverify
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 2.0.9
- **License:** ISC
- **Version published:** 2026-09-20T07:07:43.936Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-09-22T00:01:05.258Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-09-23T04:50:05.831Z
- **Known versions:** 4
- **Latest version:** 0.0.1-security
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** High-performance DOM utility and diagnostic bridge for modern web applications.
- **Author:** Exious Core team
- **Keywords:** diagnostic, verification, system, utility, windows, enterprise
- **Artifact files:** 16
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 749,959 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/sysverify/v/2.0.9>)
- [OSV advisory](<https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-16404>)
- [ADVISORY](<https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jpfv-9923-q8rq>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/sysverify/v/1.0.9>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/sysverify/v/2.0.10>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/sysverify/v/2.0.9>)
