tailwindcss-scrollbar-hide@0.0.1

dist/index.js appends `eval(atob('...'))` after the legitimate CSS-plugin export, so simply importing or requiring the package executes an obfuscated payload on the installer's machine. Identifiers in the payload (`http`, `https`, `child_process`, `spawn`, hostnames, RPC method names) are hidden with `\u00XX` escapes. The decoded payload queries Ethereum public RPCs (1rpc.io/eth, eth.drpc.org, ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com, eth-mainnet.public.blastapi.io) and eth.blockscout.com for the latest transaction from the attacker-controlled address 0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f01210763e9aDC2490Ef1a, treats the first 8 bytes of that transaction's `to` field as two IPv4 addresses, fetches second-stage bytes from `http://<ip>:443/0x/cls` and `http://<ip>:443/0x/ls`, XOR-decodes them, and runs them via `eval` and a detached `spawn('node', ['-e',...], {detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true}).unref()`. The advertised purpose is a zero-dependency pure-CSS Tailwind plugin; the presence of network, child_process, blockchain lookup, obfuscation, and dynamic code execution in that context has no legitimate purpose. The on-chain dead-drop lookup lets the operator rotate the C2 endpoint at will by broadcasting new transactions from the watched address. ## Source: ghsa-malware (1aa721b0e8aaa04d464f303d279b81f869896720a9303f2c5af21d4725b4e16c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.