registry / termdock / 1.4.259

termdock@1.4.259

A complete web-based terminal application with modern UI

AI Security Review

scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Scanner malware labels are mostly reuse of this same terminal app and a same-origin fetch false positive. Source shows a real product that can still write Termdock-owned hooks into other AI CLIs after the user runs the server, so it is a guarded agent-extension risk rather than an install-time hijack.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm postinstall, then running the termdock CLI or starting the server, then the agent-hooks install API or a stale-hook refresh.

Impact

Other agent CLIs run Termdock's hook script on session events, and stored provider tokens are read for quota checks.

Mechanism

Termdock-owned AI agent hook installer plus local token quota reads

AI rationale

Evidence

scripts/postinstall.mjsdist/server/agent/installers.jsdist/server/routes/terminal.jsdist/server/quota/tokenDiscovery.jsdist/server/utils/npmUpdate.js~/.claude/settings.json~/.codex/hooks.json~/.copilot/hooks/termdock.json~/.grok/hooks/termdock.json~/.termdock/.boot-check-ok

Network endpoints2

registry.npmjs.orgapi.anthropic.com/api/oauth/usage

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 86.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

Postinstall runs shell commands to rebuild node-pty and may use sudo package managers to install tmux.
Hook installers write Termdock commands into Claude, Codex, Copilot, Grok, OpenCode, Pi, and Kimi config files.
Starting the terminal server refreshes stale already-installed hooks in those agent configs.
Quota code reads tokens from local agent credential files and sends them to official provider usage APIs.
The running CLI service starts an npm auto-updater that can globally install a newer termdock.

Evidence against

Postinstall only prepares node-pty and tmux and writes a marker under the user Termdock directory.
First-time hook install is an HTTP API on the running server; writes are marker-guarded and skip unrelated user hook entries.
No hidden webhook or third-party leak host; network targets are official npm and model-provider APIs plus local product URLs.
The client-bundle credential finding is same-origin fetch credential mode, not an outbound secret dump.
package.json has no runtime self-dependency, and no text tries to steer this review.

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code

30 flagged

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/server/utils/kicadBoardInspection.jsView file

1import { execFile } from 'child_process'; L2: const KICAD_INSPECTION_SCRIPT = String.raw `

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/server/utils/kicadBoardInspection.jsView on unpkg · L1

dist/server/utils/bootCheck.jsView file

51const r = spawnSync(cmd, [], { L52: shell: true, L53: timeout: timeoutMs,

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/server/utils/bootCheck.jsView on unpkg · L51

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = termdock@1.4.249 matchedPath = dist/server/utils/bootCheck.js matchedIdentity = npm:dGVybWRvY2s:1.4.249 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/server/utils/bootCheck.jsView on unpkg

dist/server/routes/terminal.jsView file

16Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.exports -> dist/server/entry.js -> dist/server/routes/terminal.js L16: import QRCode from 'qrcode'; L17: import { execFile, spawn } from 'child_process'; L18: import { createHash, randomBytes, randomUUID } from 'crypto'; ... L69: const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile); L70: const TERMDOCK_DIR = `${os.homedir()}/.termdock`; L71: const automationStore = new AutomationStore(`${TERMDOCK_DIR}/automations.json`); ... L85: const raw = await fs.promises.readFile(filePath, 'utf-8'); L86: return JSON.parse(raw); L87: } ... L117: const require_ = createRequire(import.meta.url); L118: // dist/server/routes/terminal.js → ../../../package.json L119: const pkg = require_(path.join(__dirname || '', '..', '..', '..', 'package.json'));

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/server/routes/terminal.jsView on unpkg · L16

16import QRCode from 'qrcode'; L17: import { execFile, spawn } from 'child_process'; L18: import { createHash, randomBytes, randomUUID } from 'crypto'; ... L69: const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile); L70: const TERMDOCK_DIR = `${os.homedir()}/.termdock`; L71: const automationStore = new AutomationStore(`${TERMDOCK_DIR}/automations.json`); ... L85: const raw = await fs.promises.readFile(filePath, 'utf-8'); L86: return JSON.parse(raw); L87: } ... L117: const require_ = createRequire(import.meta.url); L118: // dist/server/routes/terminal.js → ../../../package.json L119: const pkg = require_(path.join(__dirname || '', '..', '..', '..', 'package.json'));

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/server/routes/terminal.jsView on unpkg · L16

dist/server/ptyhost/manager.jsView file

264// must not die with (or be reaped by) this server. L265: const child = spawn(command, args, { L266: detached: true, L267: stdio: 'ignore', L268: env: process.env, L269: }); ... L274: return new Promise((resolvePromise, rejectPromise) => { L275: const conn = net.createConnection(ptyHostSocketPath()); L276: const timer = setTimeout(() => {

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/server/ptyhost/manager.jsView on unpkg · L264

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = termdock@1.4.249 matchedPath = dist/server/ptyhost/manager.js matchedIdentity = npm:dGVybWRvY2s:1.4.249 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/server/ptyhost/manager.jsView on unpkg

dist/client/assets/app-uG4f6BEG.jsView file

1const __vite__mapDeps=(i,m=__vite__mapDeps,d=(m.f||(m.f=["assets/passwordBootstrap-Dam0wkAB.js","assets/react-XDCjal2T.js","assets/dnd-BCFAPC0L.js","assets/terminal-C7X98Amf.js","a... L2: import{r as _c,a as Rm,g as If}from"./react-XDCjal2T.js";import{b as O,R as We,r as Oc}from"./dnd-BCFAPC0L.js";import{L as Tm,l as Pm}from"./terminal-C7X98Amf.js";(function(){const... L3: ]))+`;ut.KANJI=new RegExp(n,"g"),ut.BYTE_KANJI=new RegExp("[^A-Z0-9 $%*+\\-./:]+","g"),ut.BYTE=new RegExp(r,"g"),ut.NUMERIC=new RegExp(t,"g"),ut.ALPHANUMERIC=new RegExp(e,"g");cons... ... L8: `);const B=y(T,S,A),C=t.getSymbolSize(T),E=new r(C);return h(E,T),g(E),m(E,T),w(E,S,0),T>=7&&b(E,T),R(E,B),isNaN(v)&&(v=i.getBestMask(E,w.bind(null,E,S))),i.applyMask(v,E),w(E,S,v)... L9: `;return typeof a=="function"&&a(null,b)

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/client/assets/app-uG4f6BEG.jsView on unpkg · L1

.desktop-dist/main.jsView file

6import { app, BrowserWindow, clipboard, dialog, ipcMain, Menu, net, nativeImage, Notification, powerMonitor, screen, session, shell, Tray, } from 'electron'; L7: import { execFile, spawn } from 'node:child_process'; L8: import crypto from 'node:crypto'; ... L10: import fs from 'node:fs'; L11: import http from 'node:http'; L12: import https from 'node:https'; ... L29: const projectRoot = path.resolve(currentDir, '..'); L30: const termdockDir = path.join(os.homedir(), '.termdock'); L31: const desktopConfigPath = path.join(termdockDir, 'desktop.json'); ... L56: function triggerLocalNetworkPermission() { L57: if (process.platform !== 'darwin') L58: return;

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

.desktop-dist/main.jsView on unpkg · L6

6Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> .desktop-dist/main.js L6: import { app, BrowserWindow, clipboard, dialog, ipcMain, Menu, net, nativeImage, Notification, powerMonitor, screen, session, shell, Tray, } from 'electron'; L7: import { execFile, spawn } from 'node:child_process'; L8: import crypto from 'node:crypto'; ... L10: import fs from 'node:fs'; L11: import http from 'node:http'; L12: import https from 'node:https'; ... L29: const projectRoot = path.resolve(currentDir, '..'); L30: const termdockDir = path.join(os.homedir(), '.termdock'); L31: const desktopConfigPath = path.join(termdockDir, 'desktop.json'); ... L56: function triggerLocalNetworkPermission() { L57: if (process.platform !== 'darwin') L58: return;

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

.desktop-dist/main.jsView on unpkg · L6

scripts/postinstall.mjsView file

10L11: import { execSync, spawnSync } from 'child_process'; L12: import { createRequire } from 'module'; ... L31: const r = spawnSync(cmd, [], { shell: true, timeout: timeoutMs, encoding: 'utf-8', stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'] }); L32: return { ok: r.status === 0, stdout: r.stdout, stderr: r.stderr }; L33: } catch { ... L51: const { ensureNodePty } = require_('./ensure-node-pty.cjs'); L52: const PTY_PATH = require_.resolve('node-pty/package.json', { paths: [pkgRoot] }).replace('/package.json', ''); L53: ... L83: const pty = require_(PTY_PATH); L84: const proc = pty.spawn(process.env.SHELL || '/bin/bash', [], { name: 'xterm', cols: 80, rows: 24 }); L85: proc.kill();

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

scripts/postinstall.mjsView on unpkg · L10

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = termdock@1.4.249 matchedPath = scripts/postinstall.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:dGVybWRvY2s:1.4.249 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/postinstall.mjsView on unpkg

dist/server/agent/installers.jsView file

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. import fs from 'node:fs'; import os from 'node:os'; import path from 'node:path'; import { execfile, spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { agentbyslug, ispluginagent } from './registry.js'; import { loadplugins, resolvehooktarget } from './plugins.js'; export const hook_agents = ['claude', 'codex', 'copilot', 'opencode', 'pi', 'grok', 'kimi']; const display_names = { claude: 'claude code', codex: 'codex', copilot: 'copilot cli', opencode: 'opencode', pi: 'pi', grok: 'grok build', kimi: 'kimi code', };

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

dist/server/agent/installers.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = termdock@1.4.249 matchedPath = dist/server/agent/installers.js matchedIdentity = npm:dGVybWRvY2s:1.4.249 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/server/agent/installers.jsView on unpkg

dist/server/cli.jsView file

4Detached bundled service listener: dist/server/cli.js spawns dist/server/entry.js; helper exposes a broad-bound HTTP listener. L4: // 设置（同步 fs 不占线程池，所以放在文件体顶部仍然足够早）。 L5: process.env.UV_THREADPOOL_SIZE ||= '16'; L6: import { config as loadDotenv } from 'dotenv'; ... L10: // dotenv 不会覆盖已存在的环境变量，因此系统环境变量和命令行参数优先级最高 L11: loadDotenv({ path: resolve(os.homedir(), '.termdock', '.env'), quiet: true }); L12: loadDotenv({ path: resolve(process.cwd(), '.env'), quiet: true }); ... L23: import { getMissingCertificateNames } from './utils/certificateNames.js'; L24: import http from 'http'; L25: import https from 'https'; ... L28: import { createHash, randomUUID } from 'crypto'; L29: import { spawn, spawnSync, execFile } from 'child_process'; L30: import { promisify } from 'util';

High

Spawned Bundled Service Listener

Source launches a detached bundled service that exposes a broad-bound HTTP listener.

dist/server/cli.jsView on unpkg · L4

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = termdock@1.4.249 matchedPath = dist/server/cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:dGVybWRvY2s:1.4.249 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/server/cli.jsView on unpkg

scripts/ensure-node-pty.cjsView file

51console.log('Rebuilding node-pty with the Termdock macOS FD cleanup fix...'); L52: const result = spawnSync('npx', ['--yes', 'node-gyp', 'rebuild'], { L53: cwd: ptyRoot, stdio: 'inherit', timeout: 180_000,

High

Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

scripts/ensure-node-pty.cjsView on unpkg · L51

dist/client/shell-integration/termdock.bashView file

•path = dist/client/shell-integration/termdock.bash kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 3514 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

dist/client/shell-integration/termdock.bashView on unpkg

dist/client/sw-encrypted-background.js.brView file

•path = dist/client/sw-encrypted-background.js.br kind = high_entropy_blob sizeBytes = 64690 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Ships High Entropy Blob

Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs.

dist/client/sw-encrypted-background.js.brView on unpkg

•path = dist/client/sw-encrypted-background.js.br kind = compressed_blob sizeBytes = 64690 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Compressed Blob

Package ships compressed or archive-like blobs.

dist/client/sw-encrypted-background.js.brView on unpkg

dist/server/utils/hunkApply.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/server/utils/hunkApply.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

scripts/prepare-desktop-runtime.mjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = termdock@1.4.249 matchedPath = scripts/prepare-desktop-runtime.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:dGVybWRvY2s:1.4.249 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/prepare-desktop-runtime.mjsView on unpkg

dist/server/agent/pluginPackages.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = termdock@1.4.249 matchedPath = [redacted].js matchedIdentity = npm:dGVybWRvY2s:1.4.249 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/server/agent/pluginPackages.jsView on unpkg

dist/server/android/adb.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = termdock@1.4.249 matchedPath = dist/server/android/adb.js matchedIdentity = npm:dGVybWRvY2s:1.4.249 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/server/android/adb.jsView on unpkg

dist/server/utils/npmUpdate.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = termdock@1.4.249 matchedPath = dist/server/utils/npmUpdate.js matchedIdentity = npm:dGVybWRvY2s:1.4.249 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/server/utils/npmUpdate.jsView on unpkg

dist/client/assets/DiffViewer-DQdvO9bv.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = termdock@1.4.249 matchedPath = dist/client/assets/DiffViewer-zb8C5YLR.js matchedIdentity = npm:dGVybWRvY2s:1.4.249 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/client/assets/DiffViewer-DQdvO9bv.jsView on unpkg

dist/server/agent/titleNamerCatalog.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/server/agent/titleNamerCatalog.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

30 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/server/utils/kicadBoardInspection.jsView file

1import { execFile } from 'child_process'; L2: const KICAD_INSPECTION_SCRIPT = String.raw `

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/server/utils/kicadBoardInspection.jsView on unpkg · L1

Findings

3 Critical23 High7 Medium7 Low

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/client/assets/app-uG4f6BEG.js

CriticalDownload Execute.desktop-dist/main.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capability.desktop-dist/main.js

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighChild Processdist/server/utils/kicadBoardInspection.js

HighShelldist/server/utils/bootCheck.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/server/ptyhost/manager.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilityscripts/postinstall.mjs

HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationdist/server/agent/installers.js

HighSpawned Bundled Service Listenerdist/server/cli.js

High

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to termdock@1.4.259.

See all versions of termdock for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of termdock@1.4.259 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-17 18:54:36.921Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.