registry / AI-agent control-surface risk / terminal-commander
terminal-commander
Terminal Commander: local MCP-operated terminal/file signal channel with native Linux, Windows, and macOS packages.
This report shows the evidence for terminal-commander@0.3.4. 3 of 20 known versions are blocked or flagged. The newest version, 0.3.15, is flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of detected coding-agent control configuration, expanding the package's reach into those agents. The verified lifecycle trigger and forced writes support blocking under the install control-surface policy.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Installing the package through npm in an interactive, non-CI environment without either opt-out variable.
Impact
Agent configuration is changed without installer confirmation, causing the configured agents to launch this package's MCP server.
Mechanism
The postinstall invokes bootstrap in install mode, which selects all registered providers by default and forces configuration writes for detected providers.
Policy narrative
During eligible interactive installs, the postinstall hook runs bootstrap in install mode. That mode enables auto-configuration, forces writes, and passes the default provider list to writers for detected coding-agent harnesses. The source shows opt-outs and CI/noninteractive guards, but no consent check before these changes. The resulting entries launch this package's MCP server when those agents load their configuration.
AI rationale
The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of detected coding-agent control configuration, expanding the package's reach into those agents. The verified lifecycle trigger and forced writes support blocking under the install control-surface policy.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/postinstall.jslib/bootstrap/orchestrator.jslib/harness/write_all.js
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 94.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy risk
- The npm postinstall hook automatically starts bootstrap during eligible interactive installs.
- Install mode enables automatic harness configuration and forces updates to detected providers.
- The writer selects all registered providers by default and writes MCP server configuration, including enabling the OMP server.
- The postinstall skips CI and noninteractive installs, but the source shows no consent prompt before configuration during interactive installs.
Evidence against
- The postinstall supports explicit environment opt-outs and skips CI or noninteractive environments.
- The setup targets detected coding-agent harnesses and configures this package's MCP server.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
16 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkglib/cli/setup_cursor_wsl.jsView file
119Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface:
L350: const text = serializeCursorMcpConfig({
L351: mcpServers: { [SERVER_NAME]: stanza },
L352: });
Write operation from lib/daemon/autostart.js:
L119: const dir = path.dirname(filePath);
L120: fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
L121: const tmp = path.join(dir, `.${path.basename(filePath)}.tmp-${process.pid}`);
L122: fs.writeFileSync(tmp, content, { encoding: "utf8", mode: mode || 0o644 });
L123: fs.renameSync(tmp, filePath);
Foreign user/project scope from lib/daemon/autostart.js:
L119: const dir = path.dirname(filePath);
L120: fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
L121: const tmp = path.join(dir, `.${path.basename(filePath)}.tmp-${process.pid}`);
L122: fs.writeFileSync(tmp, content, { encoding: "utf8", mode: m
Findings
1 Critical14 High4 Medium4 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijacklib/cli/setup_cursor_wsl.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedbin/terminal-commanderd.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritybin/terminal-commander.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritylib/cli/update_preflight.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritylib/daemon/autostart.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritybin/terminal-commander-mcp.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritylib/bootstrap/ensure_wsl_runtime.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritylib/cli/doctor_daemon.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritylib/cli/restart.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to terminal-commander@0.3.4.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing terminal-commander@0.3.4. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.
Versions
20 known versions0.3.15latestSuspiciousAgent extension lifecycle riskWarnPublishedOct 10, 2026, 12:54 AM0.3.14SuspiciousAgent extension lifecycle riskWarnPublishedOct 6, 2026, 8:08 PM0.3.10SuspiciousAgent extension lifecycle riskWarnPublishedOct 1, 2026, 1:51 PM0.3.9SuspiciousAgent extension lifecycle riskWarnPublishedOct 1, 2026, 12:16 PM