thalamus@1.3.0
Mobile and Web client for Claude Code
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a real cloud-controlled AI-agent capability with credential-handling and persistence implications, but the sensitive credential upload is explicitly user-invoked and the install hook is limited to unpacking local tools. The source does not establish covert install-time exfiltration or an unconsented foreign agent-control-surface mutation.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The install hook extracts bundled archives and marks extracted binaries executable.
- The explicit connect command sends an Anthropic OAuth token object to the package's default cloud service.
- A cloud response supplies MCP server definitions, including commands and arguments, which are passed into a Claude launch configuration.
- Normal CLI startup detaches a background daemon after authentication.
- The install hook only invokes the local archive unpacker; it contains no network request or foreign agent-config write.
- Credential upload is behind the explicit `thalamus connect claude` command.
- No runtime dependency on thalamus itself is declared.
- The existing Claude OAuth token is used for an Anthropic usage request, not shown being sent to the package service.
Source & flagged code
11 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
bin/thalamus-mcp.mjsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to thalamus@1.3.0.
See all versions of thalamus for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of thalamus@1.3.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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