thalamus@1.3.1
Mobile and Web client for Claude Code
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source establishes a real remote AI-agent control capability, but the inspected install hook does not modify a foreign agent configuration or contact the network. This is a high-risk remote-execution design rather than conclusive evidence of covert malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Its install hook automatically unpacks bundled platform binaries.
- The client connects to a fixed service endpoint using an authenticated session token.
- Authenticated RPC handlers can execute shell commands and read or write files in the active working directory.
- The client loads enabled MCP server commands and arguments from its remote registry.
- It injects managed agents and hooks into a Claude session at runtime.
- The MCP launcher executes the package’s bridge process and forwards the caller environment.
- The install hook only extracts package-bundled archives; no install-time network request is present in the inspected installer.
- The shell and file handlers enforce a session working-directory boundary.
- No lifecycle self-dependency or automatic write to a foreign AI-agent configuration was found.
Source & flagged code
12 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
bin/thalamus-mcp.mjsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to thalamus@1.3.1.
See all versions of thalamus for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of thalamus@1.3.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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