thalamus@1.3.2
Mobile and Web client for Claude Code
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source exposes powerful remote agent control, credential handling, optional log upload, and persistence, so it warrants a warning. The install hook only unpacks bundled tools, and no unconsented credential exfiltration or install-time control-surface mutation was found.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The normal CLI path starts a detached background daemon.
- The code reads the Claude OAuth credential file to obtain an access token.
- The explicit connect command registers Anthropic OAuth tokens with the Thalamus service.
- An environment-controlled option posts unencrypted diagnostic logs to its configured server.
- The explicit daemon installer creates a persistent macOS root launch daemon.
- The postinstall hook only unpacks bundled local archives into the package tools directory.
- Sending an Anthropic token to Thalamus requires the user to run the connect command.
- Remote log upload requires both explicit environment variables.
- The persistent daemon install is a separate command and requires root privileges.
- No self-dependency, install-time network request, or automatic mutation of Claude configuration was found.
Source & flagged code
9 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/types-EcYPGjBE.cjsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to thalamus@1.3.2.
See all versions of thalamus for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of thalamus@1.3.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.