thalamus@1.3.3
Mobile and Web client for Claude Code
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package exposes concrete remote command execution and credential-upload capabilities, creating meaningful abuse risk. The install hook is transparent package-local archive extraction, and the credential flow is explicitly user-invoked, so static source does not establish malicious install-time behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- A runtime WebSocket session registers RPC handlers and accepts remote RPC requests from the configured service.
- The remote "bash" handler passes a received command string to a shell executor in the active session directory.
- The explicit connect command obtains Anthropic authentication tokens and sends them to the Thalamus service.
- The postinstall hook only unpacks bundled tools under the package's own tools directory.
- Token registration is reached through the explicit "thalamus connect claude" command, not during installation.
- The shell handler restricts its working directory to the session directory and caps execution time.
Source & flagged code
9 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/lib.cjsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to thalamus@1.3.3.
See all versions of thalamus for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of thalamus@1.3.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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