thalamus@1.4.0
Mobile and Web client for Claude Code
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe code creates a real remote agent-control capability, but it is activated through the package's user-run service workflow rather than by an unconsented install hook. The explicit credential registration and local-only postinstall lower confidence that this release is outright malware.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- A remote Thalamus service supplies managed settings and agent definitions.
- Those remote values are injected into Claude sessions and can change agent behavior.
- The explicit connect command sends an Anthropic OAuth token to the Thalamus service.
- The install hook only extracts bundled platform tools into the package tools directory.
- Credential transfer requires the user to run the connect command; it is not performed during installation.
- No self-dependency or install-time network request was found.
Source & flagged code
10 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgSource file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/lib.cjsView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/lib.cjsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to thalamus@1.4.0.
See all versions of thalamus for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of thalamus@1.4.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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