thalamus@1.4.6
Mobile and Web client for Claude Code
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a dangerous cloud-controlled agent capability with credential handling, but the source shows user-invoked activation and no confirmed malicious install hook, secret theft, or broad automatic control-surface mutation.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package fetches enabled MCP configurations from its service and passes their command, arguments, and environment into a Claude session.
- Its connect command obtains Anthropic OAuth tokens and uploads them to the package service.
- The install hook extracts bundled archives into the package's tools directory.
- The install hook only unpacks bundled local archives; it does not contact a network service or alter agent configuration.
- The remote MCP configuration and credential upload occur only after the user runs the CLI and authenticates.
- No self-dependency or automatic foreign AI-agent configuration write was found.
Source & flagged code
10 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgSource file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/lib.cjsView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/lib.cjsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to thalamus@1.4.6.
See all versions of thalamus for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of thalamus@1.4.6 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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