thalamus@1.5.107
Mobile and Web client for Claude Code
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe install hook extracts bundled platform tools, and the inspected credential flows are scoped to GitHub sessions or use Anthropic’s own service. The reviewed evidence does not support the scanner’s exfiltration or concealed-execution claims.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The postinstall hook runs scripts/unpack-tools.cjs, which extracts bundled platform tools.
- The Git credential helper is scoped to a session and uses the GitHub credential mechanism for github.com.
- Claude OAuth tokens are used with Anthropic’s own API endpoint.
- The package describes API-key transfer to Thalamus cloud as an explicit `thalamus connect claude` command.
- No source reviewed showed install-time credential collection, an unrelated credential destination, or concealed payload execution.
- The reported subprocess use is consistent with CLI launching and session-specific Git credential handling.
Source & flagged code
21 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
bin/thalamus-mcp.mjsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to thalamus@1.5.107.
See all versions of thalamus for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of thalamus@1.5.107 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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