thalamus@1.5.16
Mobile and Web client for Claude Code
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source supports a concrete remote agent-permission escalation capability, but not malicious installation behavior, credential theft, or an unauthorized control-channel takeover. It warrants a warning because compromise or misuse of the remote session channel could materially reduce agent approval safeguards.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The session RPC accepts a remote request to change the Claude permission mode, including bypass-permissions mode.
- A bypass-permissions mode change automatically approves pending tools other than the excluded set.
- If a live bypass mode change is refused, the code requests a respawn in that mode.
- The install hook only invokes a local script that unpacks bundled platform tools.
- No evidence found of automatic modification of Claude configuration files or of credential export to an unrelated endpoint.
Source & flagged code
14 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
bin/thalamus-mcp.mjsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to thalamus@1.5.16.
See all versions of thalamus for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of thalamus@1.5.16 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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