thalamus@1.5.20
⚠ Under reviewMobile and Web client for Claude Code
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected agent paths and their callers support session transcript handling rather than install-time agent control hijacking. The required archive is binary and its executable behavior remains unverified, so the available source evidence supports neither a complete clean finding nor a malicious verdict.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The postinstall hook invokes a local archive extractor, including extraction of the platform-specific difftastic archive.
- The runtime launches the extracted difft executable. The required Linux archive contains a binary executable whose behavior was not established by source inspection.
- Both flagged agent integration locations resolve Claude project transcript directories; inspected callers check, read, or scan session files.
- The CLI supplies session MCP configuration pointing to its bundled launcher, which forwards arguments to the bridge.
- No concrete malicious install mutation, covert credential forwarding, or remote payload execution was established in the inspected source.
- The diff request handler restricts working directories and file arguments to the session scope.
Source & flagged code
14 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
bin/thalamus-mcp.mjsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to thalamus@1.5.20.
See all versions of thalamus for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of thalamus@1.5.20 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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