registry  /  thinkpool-pair  /  0.7.148

thinkpool-pair@0.7.148

Share a local coding-agent CLI (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Aider, …) into a ThinkPool Code room, live.

AI Security Review

scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface was established. The package is a remote coding-agent bridge with powerful but advertised, user-invoked terminal, service, and update features.

Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
User runs thinkpool-pair CLI or explicit service/account commands
Impact
Shares local agent terminals/files with ThinkPool rooms; risk is inherent to intended use, not hidden malware.
Mechanism
User-authorized remote agent bridge and optional service installer
Rationale
Static inspection shows a feature-rich ThinkPool remote coding bridge with network, child process, package-manager, and persistence primitives, but they are documented/user-invoked and aligned with the package purpose. I found no lifecycle execution, hidden payload, credential harvesting, covert exfiltration, or unconsented AI-agent control-surface mutation.
Evidence
package.jsonbridge.mjsaccount.mjsservice.mjsauth-store.mjsprovider.mjsbyok-detect.mjsflow-assembly.mjs
Network endpoints5
daytvtakmlixpfbbqzjd.supabase.cothinkpool.ioregistry.npmjs.org/thinkpool-pair/latestapi.anthropic.comopenrouter.ai/api

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 86.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • bridge.mjs exposes user-invoked remote terminal/agent sharing over Supabase rooms
  • service.mjs can install launchd/systemd/Startup persistence only via install-service command
  • account.mjs restart handler may spawn npx thinkpool-pair@latest install-service when service is active
  • bridge.mjs handles room file downloads from payload.url into a temp room directory
Evidence against
  • package.json has no install/preinstall/postinstall hooks; bin entry is bridge.mjs
  • bridge.mjs room code is validated before use and account mode is user-invoked
  • Supabase anon JWT in bridge.mjs is labeled public client credential, not a private secret
  • Shell/git/zip/gh execution appears tied to user commands, service management, or Flow assembly features
  • service.mjs validates room labels before shell/service interpolation
  • No source evidence of credential harvesting, hidden exfiltration, destructive install-time behavior, or reviewer prompt injection
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Manifest
NoLicense
scanned 27 file(s), 561 KB of source, external domains: api.anthropic.com, api.z.ai, daytvtakmlixpfbbqzjd.supabase.co, openrouter.ai, registry.npmjs.org, thinkpool.io, www.apple.com

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source
bridge.mjsView file
94patternName = supabase_service_key severity = critical line = 94 matchedText = const SU...tqo'
Critical
Critical Secret

Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern.

bridge.mjsView on unpkg · L94
94patternName = supabase_service_key severity = critical line = 94 matchedText = const SU...tqo'
Critical
Secret Pattern

Supabase service role key (JWT) in bridge.mjs

bridge.mjsView on unpkg · L94
flow-assembly.mjsView file
14// L15: // Node built-ins ONLY (fs, path, child_process, zlib) — bridge ships as npm L16: // thinkpool-pair with no new deps. Pure over injected fs/git/gh/readFile so the
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

flow-assembly.mjsView on unpkg · L14
service.mjsView file
22import path from 'node:path' L23: import { execSync } from 'node:child_process' L24: ... L26: // exactly one account service per machine (a second install replaces it). L27: // Room codes flow UNESCAPED into launchctl/systemd shell strings + plist paths, so L28: // this is the security chokepoint: reject anything that isn't a plain alnum code ... L44: // `home` is the platform-correct, runtime-expanded home token ("$HOME" on darwin under L45: // /bin/bash; "$$HOME" inside a systemd unit so systemd emits a literal $HOME to bash). L46: const cacheWipe = (home) => `rm -rf ${home}/.npm/_npx/*/node_modules/thinkpool-pair 2>/dev/null` ... L48: // The version installing the service. By DEFAULT the service is pinned to this exact L49: // version (not @latest) so a future bad npm publish can't auto-roll to every machine's L50: // always-on bridge — that's what spread the broken 0.7.49 on 2026-06-22. Updates become
Medium
Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

service.mjsView on unpkg · L22
account.mjsView file
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = thinkpool-pair@0.7.147 matchedIdentity = npm:dGhpbmtwb29sLXBhaXI:0.7.147 similarity = 0.963 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
Critical
Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

account.mjsView on unpkg
1/* account.mjs — account-mode bridge (Phase 1). L2: One `npx thinkpool-pair` per ACCOUNT instead of per room: L3: login — link this device to your ThinkPool account (realtime handoff). ... L8: Spec: docs/specs/2026-06-16-account-bridge.md */ L9: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process' L10: import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
High
Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

account.mjsView on unpkg · L1

Findings

3 Critical3 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalCritical Secretbridge.mjs
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltaaccount.mjs
CriticalSecret Patternbridge.mjs
HighChild Processflow-assembly.mjs
HighShell
HighRuntime Package Installaccount.mjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumInstall Persistenceservice.mjs
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License