registry / tinkoff-fb-app-frame-page-height-dippy / 20.8.4

tinkoff-fb-app-frame-page-height-dippy@20.8.4

Tinkoff fb app frame page height dippy runtime support module

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Importing the package silently retrieves a platform-specific executable payload and runs it detached. A DNS TXT transport provides a fallback payload channel.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Any require/import of the package's main entrypoint, unless telemetry opt-out environment variables are set.

Impact

Arbitrary remote code executes with the importing process's permissions.

Mechanism

import-time remote payload download, temp-file drop, and detached execution

Attack narrative

Loading index.js imports _platform.js. Its immediately invoked setup routine downloads a platform-specific binary from rotating HTTPS hosts, or reconstructs one from DNS TXT records. It drops the bytes into a disguised temporary executable, sets execute permission on non-Windows systems, and starts it via a detached shell or cmd.exe process.

Rationale

This is a concrete, unconsented import-time remote-code-execution chain with stealthy payload delivery and execution. The absence of lifecycle hooks does not mitigate activation on ordinary package import.

Evidence

package.jsonindex.js_platform.jslib/telemetry.js/tmp/.analytics_state/var/tmp/.cache_<random>

Network endpoints8

oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.devoob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev

On require, index.js loads _platform.js, which reconstructs C2 hostnames via runtime string concatenation (joining fragments such as 'oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.de'+'v' and 'tin.dl.well1'+'.si'+'te'), selects a per-OS/architecture binary, and downloads bytes over HTTPS from one of four anonymous Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, cf102-, cf103-, cf104-) with a DNS TXT-record fallback via well1.site. The retrieved payload is written to /tmp as a hidden dot-file (e.g. /tmp/.cache_<rand>,.analytics_state lock file) on POSIX or to %TEMP% as dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe on Windows, chmodded 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd /c start. A shipped lib/telemetry.js further concatenates 'child_'+'process' and 'chmod'+'Sync' to evade static analysis. The package name and description bear no relation to this behavior; the entire on-require code path is a binary dropper executing attacker-controlled native code on the installer's host. ## Source: ghsa-malware (352c999918247ad135d65d4ff9da1f6e5e9788b5f574565f59ff30f2b227863e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

tinkoff-fb-app-frame-page-height-dippy@20.8.4

AI Security Review

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