--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/tnega/v/0.4.5" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/tnega/v/0.4.5.md" package: "tnega" report_status: "published" title: "tnega@0.4.5 npm security report" verdict: "clean" version: "0.4.5" --- # tnega@0.4.5 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Allowed — no malicious behavior detected** — No malicious behavior detected. 25 low-signal pattern(s) reviewed. - **Verdict:** Clean - **Product-default install policy:** Allow - **Firewall policy:** No policy match - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** None published - **Selected version:** 0.4.5 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: clean; recommendation: mark clean. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. Inspected behavior is consistent with an agent harness, including workspace approval rules and user-invoked execution tools. The self-dependency merits attention but this release lacks the automatic install hook required for the defined blocking chain, and no separate concrete attack was found. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Clean - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 86.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-01T18:20:47.349Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-01T18:23:08.581Z - **Download time:** 1796 ms - **Static scan time:** 32771 ms - **AI review time:** 106664 ms - **Total time:** 141232 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** No concrete attack was identified in the inspected source. The flagged agent integration reads approval constraints, while execution and network capabilities serve the agent runtime. - **Trigger:** Explicit CLI commands or caller-invoked runtime tools; no registry-install lifecycle trigger was found. - **Impact:** No confirmed credential theft, foreign agent configuration mutation, or malicious install behavior was established. - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-01T18:23:08.581Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Workspace rule reading, configured approval review, request-driven process execution, and service authentication show package-aligned behavior. - **Rationale:** Inspected behavior is consistent with an agent harness, including workspace approval rules and user-invoked execution tools. The self-dependency merits attention but this release lacks the automatic install hook required for the defined blocking chain, and no separate concrete attack was found. - **Files touched:** AGENTS.md - **Network endpoints:** https://api.deepseek.com/anthropic/v1/messages ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Clean - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Recommended action:** mark\_clean - **Intent class:** Benign - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for AI clean decision:** package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; its runtime self-dependency therefore does not establish the specified malicious lifecycle chain., The flagged code in dist/bin.js, dist/cli-runtime.js, and dist/index.js reads workspace AGENTS.md for approval constraints without modifying it; approval defaults to manual., dist/tools.js provides request-driven execution and applies configured tool authorization policies., dist/web/assets/jszip.min-B3xE1mmA.js implements ZIP loading through its archive API., Web search selects a DeepSeek credential and sends it to the fixed DeepSeek API endpoint., The CLI activates agent execution through an explicit run command requiring a prompt. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to tnega@0.4.5. - Review the evidence and your use of tnega@0.4.5 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/tools.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1620: // packages/execution/src/index.ts L1621: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L1622: import { lookup } from "node:dns/promises"; ``` ### 4. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/tools.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1722: ...spawnOptions(request.cwd, "pipe"), L1723: shell: true L1724: }), ``` ### 5. High: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 80.0% - **Path:** dist/web/assets/jszip.min-B3xE1mmA.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic code evaluation. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: import{b as vt,g as Bt}from"./index-Bu31tFeR.js";import{c as yt}from"./_commonjs-dynamic-modules-TDtrdbi3.js";function Rt(ct,wt){for(var _=0;_) Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L5: ${g.name} L6: `;const w=document.createElement("div");w.className="error__message",w.textContent=g.message;const S=document.createElement("div");S.className="error__time",S.textContent=new Date(... L7: `)}getTableData(l){return null}getAllTableData(l){const c=[];for(let o=0;o) Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1244: // validation function arguments L1245: data: new codegen_1.Name("data"), L1246: // data passed to validation function ... L2271: id = normalizeId(id); L2272: return resolver.resolve(baseId, id); L2273: } ... L3152: for (i = 0; i < input.length; i++) { L3153: code = input[i].charCodeAt(0); L3154: if (code === 48) { ... L7211: function checkPathExt(path, options) { L7212: var pathext = options.pathExt !== void 0 ? options.pathExt : process.env.PATHEXT; L7213: if (!pathext) { ``` ### 8. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 9. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 10. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 11. High: Credential Redirect Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: writeFile(filename, options) { writeFile(filename, options) { var fs$writeFile = fs3.writeFile; fs3.writeFile = writeFile19; function writeFile19(path, data2, options, cb) { return go$writeFile(path, data2, options, cb); function go$writeFile(path2, data3, options2, cb2, startTime) { return fs$writeFile(path2, data3, options2, function(err) { ``` ### 12. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1244: // validation function arguments L1245: data: new codegen_1.Name("data"), L1246: // data passed to validation function ... L2271: id = normalizeId(id); L2272: return resolver.resolve(baseId, id); L2273: } ... L3152: for (i = 0; i < input.length; i++) { L3153: code = input[i].charCodeAt(0); L3154: if (code === 48) { ... L7211: function checkPathExt(path, options) { L7212: var pathext = options.pathExt !== void 0 ? options.pathExt : process.env.PATHEXT; L7213: if (!pathext) { ``` ### 13. Critical: Download Execute - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1244: // validation function arguments L1245: data: new codegen_1.Name("data"), L1246: // data passed to validation function ... L2271: id = normalizeId(id); L2272: return resolver.resolve(baseId, id); L2273: } ... L3152: for (i = 0; i < input.length; i++) { L3153: code = input[i].charCodeAt(0); L3154: if (code === 48) { ... L7211: function checkPathExt(path, options) { L7212: var pathext = options.pathExt !== void 0 ? options.pathExt : process.env.PATHEXT; L7213: if (!pathext) { ``` ### 14. High: Obfuscated Payload Loader - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L55735: if (!fs2[gracefulQueue]) { L55736: queue2 = global[gracefulQueue] || []; L55737: publishQueue(fs2, queue2); ``` ### 15. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 72.0% - **Path:** dist/bin.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/bin.js spawns dist/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L179: async function isWindowsAclAvailable() { L180: if (process.platform !== "win32") return false; L181: try { ... L592: } L593: function assertPrivateTempDisjoint(tempDir, writableDirs) { L594: for (const writableDir of writableDirs) { ... L805: * L806: * @see https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types/text/html IANA MimeType registration L807: * @see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML Wikipedia ... L2526: function _xmlEncoder(c) { L2527: return c == "<" && "<" || c == ">" && ">" || c == "&" && "&" || c == '"' && """ || "&#" + c.charCodeAt() + ";"; L2528: } ``` ### 16. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.exports -> dist/index.js L1244: // validation function arguments L1245: data: new codegen_1.Name("data"), L1246: // data passed to validation function ... L2271: id = normalizeId(id); L2272: return resolver.resolve(baseId, id); L2273: } ... L3152: for (i = 0; i < input.length; i++) { L3153: code = input[i].charCodeAt(0); L3154: if (code === 48) { ... L7211: function checkPathExt(path, options) { L7212: var pathext = options.pathExt !== void 0 ? options.pathExt : process.env.PATHEXT; L7213: if (!pathext) { ``` ### 17. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 18. Low: Telemetry - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs. ### 19. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 20. Medium: Ships Wasm Module - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** dist/quickjs.wasm - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships WebAssembly modules. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = dist/quickjs.wasm kind = wasm_module sizeBytes = 637405 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 21. Medium: Oversized Source File - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** dist/bin.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript path = dist/bin.js kind = oversized_source_file sizeBytes = 5568667 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 22. Medium: Oversized Cli Entrypoint - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 80.0% - **Path:** dist/bin.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains an oversized executable-looking CLI entrypoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript path = dist/bin.js kind = oversized_cli_entrypoint sizeBytes = 5568667 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 23. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 24. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/cli-runtime.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_path_work_budget_exceeded; limitedFiles = 6 ``` ### 25. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** dist/bin.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = tnega@0.4.1 matchedIdentity = npm:dG5lZ2E:0.4.1 similarity = 1.222 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 1 - **Optional dependencies:** 1 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 7 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 2 ### Published dependency entries - tnega ^0.1.1 (Dependency) - koffi ^3.1.0 (OptionalDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** tnega - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.4.5 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-10-01T18:07:26.324Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-31T19:49:51.355Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-03T11:48:26.979Z - **Known versions:** 17 - **Latest version:** 0.5.6 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** A minimal eval-first agent harness with spacetime-composable plugin lifecycles. - **Maintainers:** whale4rain - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22.19.0 - **Artifact files:** 305 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 69,566,464 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()