toga-ai@1.0.1030
TOGA Technology Team Claude Knowledge System — shared AI coding harness with skills, knowledge base CLI, and project installer for Claude Code.
AI Security Review
scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package automatically enables global Claude telemetry that includes private prompt, response, and tool content during npm postinstall. This unconsented lifecycle mutation of an agent control surface warrants blocking, regardless of whether an upload occurs during installation.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Installing the package through npm, which runs its postinstall hook.
Impact
Later Claude Code telemetry may disclose prompts, responses, tool details, and associated metadata to the configured collector. This review confirms the settings mutation, not a completed upload.
Mechanism
The installer writes telemetry settings into the user's global Claude settings, enabling prompt, response, and tool-detail logging to otel.togaiq.com. An environment setting can opt out, but installation does not request affirmative consent.
Policy narrative
The npm postinstall hook invokes the installer, which automatically modifies the user's global Claude settings. The enabled telemetry includes prompts, assistant responses, and tool details and directs them to otel.togaiq.com. The source provides an opt-out variable but no affirmative consent step, so the configuration change can cause later disclosure of private agent content.
AI rationale
The package automatically enables global Claude telemetry that includes private prompt, response, and tool content during npm postinstall. This unconsented lifecycle mutation of an agent control surface warrants blocking, regardless of whether an upload occurs during installation.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/install.js~/.claude/settings.json
Network endpoints1
otel.togaiq.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 99.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy risk
- The package manifest runs scripts/install.js automatically from its postinstall hook.
- The installer configures Claude telemetry to send user prompts, assistant responses, and tool details to otel.togaiq.com, and writes those settings to the user's global Claude configuration.
- The installer applies this change on every install, including postinstall; it provides an opt-out setting but no affirmative consent step.
- The flagged helper locations use per-session files or locate project configuration; they do not establish a separate attack behavior.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
18 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install.js --post-install
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install.js --post-install
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgscripts/install.jsView file
11* 3. If git available: use git repo as source (newer); otherwise use npm bundle silently
L12: * 4. Install from chosen source into project .claude/
L13: *
...
L35: // Team skills that were retired from the bundle. Install MOVES them out of a dev's
L36: // .claude/skills/ (to .claude/sk[redacted]/<name>-<yyyymmdd>) so they stop loading but
L37: // nothing is lost. Only moved when the bundle no longer ships them.
...
L100: try {
L101: fs.writeFileSync(CACHE_FILE, repoDir + '\n');
L102: } catch (e) { /* non-fatal */ }
...
L114: try {
L115: fs.mkdirSync(defaultDir, { recursive: true });
L116:
Findings
1 Critical15 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackscripts/install.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighExternal Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationscripts/install.js
HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationscripts/install.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedskills/start/scripts/ticket-parse.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityknowledge.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityscripts/hooks/start-gate.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityskills/commit/scripts/commit-helper.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityskills/start/scripts/start-helper.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityscripts/harness.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to toga-ai@1.0.1030.
See all versions of toga-ai for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing toga-ai@1.0.1030. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.