toga-ai@1.0.1044
TOGA Technology Team Claude Knowledge System — shared AI coding harness with skills, knowledge base CLI, and project installer for Claude Code.
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook automatically enables global Claude Code content telemetry to a configured collector without affirmative consent. This is an AI-agent control-surface hijack; the source establishes deferred disclosure through changed settings, not direct package-side collection.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Installing toga-ai with npm, which runs its postinstall hook.
Impact
Future Claude Code activity may disclose private prompts, responses, tool details, and account or session identifiers to the configured collector.
Mechanism
The installer writes telemetry export settings into ~/.claude/settings.json; an opt-out exists, but no affirmative consent is required.
Policy narrative
During npm installation, the postinstall hook changes the user's global Claude Code settings to enable content telemetry and send it to otel.togaiq.com. The settings include user prompts, assistant responses, tool details, and account and session identifiers. The change occurs without affirmative consent; only an opt-out is available. This establishes automatic agent control-surface mutation and deferred disclosure, though the inspected source does not show the package itself uploading the content.
AI rationale
The postinstall hook automatically enables global Claude Code content telemetry to a configured collector without affirmative consent. This is an AI-agent control-surface hijack; the source establishes deferred disclosure through changed settings, not direct package-side collection.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/install.js~/.claude/settings.json
Network endpoints1
otel.togaiq.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 99.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy risk
- package.json runs scripts/install.js from its postinstall hook.
- scripts/install.js enables Claude telemetry and sends prompt, assistant response, and tool details to otel.togaiq.com; it also enables account and session identifiers.
- The installer applies these settings to the user-level ~/.claude/settings.json and provides only an opt-out, with no affirmative consent gate.
- The postinstall path calls the telemetry settings mutation, which writes the changed settings file.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
18 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install.js --post-install
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install.js --post-install
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgscripts/install.jsView file
11* 3. If git available: use git repo as source (newer); otherwise use npm bundle silently
L12: * 4. Install from chosen source into project .claude/
L13: *
...
L35: // Team skills that were retired from the bundle. Install MOVES them out of a dev's
L36: // .claude/skills/ (to .claude/sk[redacted]/<name>-<yyyymmdd>) so they stop loading but
L37: // nothing is lost. Only moved when the bundle no longer ships them.
...
L100: try {
L101: fs.writeFileSync(CACHE_FILE, repoDir + '\n');
L102: } catch (e) { /* non-fatal */ }
...
L114: try {
L115: fs.mkdirSync(defaultDir, { recursive: true });
L116:
Findings
1 Critical15 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackscripts/install.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighExternal Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationscripts/install.js
HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationscripts/install.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedskills/start/scripts/ticket-parse.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityknowledge.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityscripts/hooks/start-gate.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityskills/commit/scripts/commit-helper.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityskills/start/scripts/start-helper.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityscripts/harness.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to toga-ai@1.0.1044.
See all versions of toga-ai for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing toga-ai@1.0.1044. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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