trace-mcp@3.11.0
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AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is not proven credential theft or foreign AI-client takeover, but automatic postinstall persistence and application replacement are substantial package lifecycle behavior. The package-owned scope and checksum verification support a warning rather than a block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The automatic postinstall chain runs two scripts that change user-level state.
- The control-plane script writes an executable launcher under the user's trace-mcp directory.
- On macOS it creates and bootstraps a persistent LaunchAgent that runs the package's HTTP daemon.
- A separate postinstall script contacts GitHub release APIs and can replace installed trace-mcp app bundles.
- The persistent service runs the package's own trace-mcp command and its health check is local only.
- The app updater requires a matching SHA-256 release asset before applying an update.
- No runtime dependency on trace-mcp itself is declared.
- No install-time code directly edits Claude, Codex, or other AI-client configuration files.
Source & flagged code
15 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
scripts/verify-upgrade-path.mjsView on unpkg · L25Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to trace-mcp@3.11.0.
See all versions of trace-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of trace-mcp@3.11.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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