trace-mcp@3.15.0
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AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has a real automatic persistence and self-update surface, so it warrants a warning. The inspected code scopes that behavior to trace-mcp-owned paths and bundles, with no confirmed theft, remote shell execution, or third-party control-surface takeover.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The automatic postinstall chain runs two package-authored system-mutation scripts.
- On macOS, postinstall writes a per-user LaunchAgent and bootstraps it, starting the package daemon without an explicit command.
- Postinstall can download and replace an installed trace-mcp application bundle.
- The persistence targets are trace-mcp-owned paths and its own LaunchAgent, not a broad third-party agent configuration.
- The updater limits bundle changes to identified trace-mcp application bundles and includes checksum and platform guards.
- No credential harvesting, secret exfiltration, or arbitrary remote command execution was found in the inspected files.
Source & flagged code
15 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
scripts/verify-upgrade-path.mjsView on unpkg · L25Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to trace-mcp@3.15.0.
See all versions of trace-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of trace-mcp@3.15.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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