trace-mcp@3.23.1
Framework-aware code intelligence MCP server — 87 framework integrations, 81 languages, 72.8% fewer input tokens to review a pull request, comprehension at parity
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a concrete automatic lifecycle persistence and remote-update surface. It appears package-owned and includes safeguards, so static source does not establish malware or exfiltration, but the behavior warrants a warning.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Its automatic postinstall runs two state-changing installer scripts.
- On macOS, installation writes and bootstraps a per-user launchd service with RunAtLoad and KeepAlive.
- The installer fetches a release archive and checksum, then can replace installed application bundles in place.
- The launchd service, paths, and updater are named for this package rather than an unrelated agent.
- The updater verifies a matching checksum before replacement and provides environment-variable opt-outs.
- No source evidence shows credential theft, secret exfiltration, or modification of Claude or Codex configuration during postinstall.
Source & flagged code
16 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to trace-mcp@3.23.1.
See all versions of trace-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of trace-mcp@3.23.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.