--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/trace-mcp/v/3.26.0" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/trace-mcp/v/3.26.0.md" package: "trace-mcp" report_status: "published" title: "trace-mcp@3.26.0 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "3.26.0" --- # trace-mcp@3.26.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 3.26.0 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. This is an automatic lifecycle persistence mechanism with meaningful install-time side effects, so it warrants a warning. The inspected behavior is package-aligned and lacks a concrete malicious chain or self-dependency. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 90.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-15T09:54:14.490Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-15T09:55:25.050Z - **Download time:** 2024 ms - **Static scan time:** 3655 ms - **AI review time:** 64878 ms - **Total time:** 70560 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Installing the package automatically configures trace-mcp launcher state. On macOS it creates and bootstraps a persistent per-user LaunchAgent for the package daemon; a legacy-app migration path can contact GitHub for an update. - **Trigger:** npm installation or upgrade, through postinstall - **Impact:** A package daemon can be started and kept alive without a separate trace command; legacy app bundles may be updated during installation. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall-control-plane.mjs, scripts/postinstall-app.mjs - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-15T09:55:25.050Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** automatic package-owned launcher, daemon persistence, and legacy app update - **Rationale:** This is an automatic lifecycle persistence mechanism with meaningful install-time side effects, so it warrants a warning. The inspected behavior is package-aligned and lacks a concrete malicious chain or self-dependency. - **Files touched:** ~/.trace/launcher.env, ~/.trace/bin/trace, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.trace-mcp.server.plist, scripts/postinstall-control-plane.mjs, scripts/postinstall-app.mjs - **Network endpoints:** api.github.com, 127.0.0.1 ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for warning:** The package runs three scripts automatically during postinstall., Postinstall creates a package-owned launcher and records paths under the user's home directory., On macOS, postinstall writes and bootstraps a persistent LaunchAgent that starts the local daemon., A conditional postinstall updater contacts GitHub to replace legacy trace-mcp app bundles. - **Evidence against:** No runtime dependency on trace-mcp itself was found., The control-plane script only manages trace-mcp-owned paths and does not modify Claude or Codex configuration., The legacy app updater verifies a SHA-256 checksum and uses Gatekeeper before replacing an app., No credential harvesting or secret exfiltration was identified in the inspected lifecycle scripts. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to trace-mcp@3.26.0. - Review the evidence and your use of trace-mcp@3.26.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/preflight-native.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-app.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-control-plane.mjs ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/preflight-native.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-app.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-control-plane.mjs ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/proxy.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L27320: // src/daemon/lifecycle.ts L27321: import { execSync, execFileSync, spawn } from "child_process"; L27322: import fs11 from "fs"; ``` ### 6. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/proxy.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L2474: function hasPreloadFlags() { L2475: const execArgv = process.execArgv; L2476: for (let i = 0; i < execArgv.length; i++) { ``` ### 7. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/proxy.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L2: import { createRequire as __tmcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module'; L3: const require = __tmcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url); L4: var __create = Object.create; ``` ### 8. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 9. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 10. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/proxy.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1103: for (var i = 0; i < flen; ) { L1104: if (f.charCodeAt(i) === 37 && i + 1 < flen) { L1105: lastPos = lastPos > -1 ? lastPos : 0; ... L1338: fsWriteSync = () => fs16.writeSync(this.fd, this._writingBuf); L1339: fsWrite = () => fs16.write(this.fd, this._writingBuf, this.release); L1340: } else if (contentMode === void 0 || contentMode === kContentModeUtf8) { ... L1903: L1904: // node_modules/.pnpm/thread-stream@4.0.0/node_modules/thread-stream/package.json L1905: var require_package = __commonJS({ ... L1943: type: "git", L1944: url: "git+https://github.com/mcollina/thread-stream.git" L1945: }, ``` ### 11. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 12. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** scripts/capture-screenshots.mjs\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text L390: // six grey placeholders is exactly the failure this pipeline exists to avoid. L391: const dashboard = `http://127.0.0.1:${DEMO_DAEMON_PORT}/api/dashboard`; L392: await fetch(`${dashboard}/refresh`, { method: "POST" }); ... L402: * The guard"s health comes from a heartbeat an attached agent session writes.\n * A capture has no agent, so without this the showcase screenshot ships a red\n * \"Not running\" ba... L403: * policy") — the window comes up blank. Assigning `location.href` inside the\n * document keeps the app's own file origin, exactly as the main process does.\n */\nasync function na... L404: return; ``` ### 13. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** scripts/capture-screenshots.mjs\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text L390: // six grey placeholders is exactly the failure this pipeline exists to avoid. L391: const dashboard = `http://127.0.0.1:${DEMO_DAEMON_PORT}/api/dashboard`; L392: await fetch(`${dashboard}/refresh`, { method: "POST" }); ... L401: /** L402: * The guard"s health comes from a heartbeat an attached agent session writes.\n * A capture has no agent, so without this the showcase screenshot ships a red\n * \"Not running\" ba... L403: * policy") — the window comes up blank. Assigning `location.href` inside the\n * document keeps the app's own file origin, exactly as the main process does.\n */\nasync function na... L404: return; ``` ### 14. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** scripts/verify-upgrade-path.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L25: L26: import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; L27: import fs from 'node:fs'; ... L34: L35: if (process.platform !== 'darwin') { L36: console.log('skip: macOS only'); ... L48: const repoRoot = path.resolve(new URL('..', import.meta.url).pathname); L49: const expected = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(repoRoot, 'package.json'), 'utf-8')).version; L50: ... L62: try { L63: const res = await fetch(`https://api.github.com/repos/${REPO}/releases?per_page=10`, { L64: headers: { 'User-Agent': 'trace-mcp' }, ``` ### 15. High: Runtime Package Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** scripts/record-wire-fixtures.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L20: * Usage: L21: * npx tsx scripts/record-wire-fixtures.ts [--project ] [--port ] L22: * ... L25: */ L26: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; L27: import fs from 'node:fs'; ``` ### 16. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 17. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 18. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** hooks/trace-mcp-reindex.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = hooks/trace-mcp-reindex.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 8298 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 19. Medium: Oversized Source File - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** dist/snapshot-backend.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript path = dist/snapshot-backend.js kind = oversized_source_file sizeBytes = 11116918 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 20. Medium: Oversized Cli Entrypoint - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 80.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains an oversized executable-looking CLI entrypoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript path = dist/cli.js kind = oversized_cli_entrypoint sizeBytes = 12863483 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 21. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 22. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** scripts/bench-response-tokens.ts\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 7 ``` ### 23. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/capture-screenshots.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = trace-mcp@3.25.1 matchedPath = scripts/capture-screenshots.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:dHJhY2UtbWNw:3.25.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 24. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall-app.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = trace-mcp@3.25.1 matchedPath = scripts/postinstall-app.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:dHJhY2UtbWNw:3.25.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 25. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/verify-upgrade-path.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = trace-mcp@3.25.1 matchedPath = scripts/verify-upgrade-path.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:dHJhY2UtbWNw:3.25.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 26. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/verify-win-update.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = trace-mcp@3.25.1 matchedPath = scripts/verify-win-update.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:dHJhY2UtbWNw:3.25.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 27. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/proxy.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = trace-mcp@3.25.1 matchedPath = dist/proxy.js matchedIdentity = npm:dHJhY2UtbWNw:3.25.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 28. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/bench-session-scaling.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = trace-mcp@3.25.1 matchedPath = scripts/bench-session-scaling.ts matchedIdentity = npm:dHJhY2UtbWNw:3.25.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 29. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/gen-readme-banner.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = trace-mcp@3.25.1 matchedPath = scripts/gen-readme-banner.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:dHJhY2UtbWNw:3.25.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 30. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/gen-sitemap.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = trace-mcp@3.25.1 matchedPath = scripts/gen-sitemap.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:dHJhY2UtbWNw:3.25.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 31. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/perf/daemon-query-alloc.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = trace-mcp@3.25.1 matchedPath = scripts/perf/daemon-query-alloc.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:dHJhY2UtbWNw:3.25.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 32. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/perf/daemon-serving-rss.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = trace-mcp@3.25.1 matchedPath = scripts/perf/daemon-serving-rss.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:dHJhY2UtbWNw:3.25.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 33. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall-control-plane.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = trace-mcp@3.25.1 matchedPath = scripts/postinstall-control-plane.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:dHJhY2UtbWNw:3.25.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 34. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/record-wire-fixtures.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = trace-mcp@3.25.1 matchedPath = scripts/record-wire-fixtures.ts matchedIdentity = npm:dHJhY2UtbWNw:3.25.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepare, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 21 - **Optional dependencies:** 2 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 17 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 23 ### Published dependency entries - @ast-grep/napi ^0.45.0 (Dependency) - @clack/prompts ^1.2.0 (Dependency) - @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.29.0 (Dependency) - @parcel/watcher ^2.5.6 (Dependency) - @toon-format/toon 4.1.1 (Dependency) - @vue/compiler-sfc ^3.5.32 (Dependency) - better-sqlite3 ^13.0.3 (Dependency) - commander ^14.0.3 (Dependency) - cosmiconfig ^10.0.0 (Dependency) - fast-glob ^3.3.3 (Dependency) - fastest-levenshtein ^1.0.16 (Dependency) - jsonc-parser ^3.3.1 (Dependency) - neverthrow ^8.2.0 (Dependency) - oxc-resolver ^11.19.1 (Dependency) - picomatch ^4.0.4 (Dependency) - pino ^10.3.1 (Dependency) - tree-sitter-wasm ^1.1.6 (Dependency) - web-tree-sitter ^0.26.13 (Dependency) - xxhash-wasm ^1.1.0 (Dependency) - yaml ^2.8.3 (Dependency) - zod ^4.3.6 (Dependency) - @huggingface/transformers ^4.0.1 (OptionalDependency) - sqlite-vec ^0.1.9 (OptionalDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** trace-mcp - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 3.26.0 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-09-15T04:31:35.203Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-02T12:05:04.293Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-19T22:28:17.078Z - **Known versions:** 82 - **Latest version:** 3.38.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Framework-aware code intelligence MCP server — 88 framework integrations, 81 languages, 72.7% fewer input tokens to review a pull request, comprehension at parity - **Author:** Nikolai Vysotskyi - **Maintainers:** nikolai-vysotskyi - **Keywords:** mcp-server, claude-code, cursor, ai-agents, code-graph, dependency-graph, token-optimization, mcp, code-intelligence, laravel, vue, nuxt - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 143 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 136,829,624 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** Yes - **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()