tracist@0.0.53
Upload and continuously stream local AI coding transcripts to Tracist
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is not malicious npm lifecycle behavior, but source confirms an undocumented high-impact remote AI-agent and workspace-control capability in the normal authenticated streaming path. Warn rather than block because activation requires explicit user execution and authentication.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- scripts/capture-resume-multiturn.js accepts server-sent filesystem read requests.
- It accepts server-queued file saves within a session working directory.
- Queued prompts launch/resume AI agents with bypass-permission flags, including Codex sandbox/approval bypass.
- bin/tracist.js runs the control-capable streamer by default after user authentication.
- bin/tracist.js can install a persistent user daemon on explicit `install`.
- package.json `prepare` only builds package-local runtime files; it does not install or start the daemon.
- The documented purpose is transcript upload and the network host defaults to tracist.dev.
- Secret-redaction code is applied to outbound transcript content.
- Persistence requires the explicit `tracist install` command.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourceA manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.
bin/tracist.jsView on unpkg · L7Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to tracist@0.0.53.
See all versions of tracist for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of tracist@0.0.53 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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