---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/tracist/v/0.0.60"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/tracist/v/0.0.60.md"
package: "tracist"
report_status: "published"
title: "tracist@0.0.60 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.0.60"
---

# tracist@0.0.60 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 17 finding(s) warrant review before installing.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Remote Code Execution
- **Selected version:** 0.0.60
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

This is an overt, authenticated product feature rather than stealth install-time malware, but it grants a remote service unusually broad control over local AI agents. Warn rather than block because persistence is explicit-user-command and no unconsented lifecycle mutation or covert exfiltration was found.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 93.0%
- **Started:** 2026-08-09T20:09:38.627Z
- **Finished:** 2026-08-09T20:10:45.155Z
- **Download time:** 255 ms
- **Static scan time:** 1156 ms
- **AI review time:** 65115 ms
- **Total time:** 66528 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** An installed Tracist daemon connects to tracist.dev and accepts queued remote prompts, attachments, file operations, interrupts, and steering requests. It can invoke/resume local AI coding sessions with unrestricted sandbox settings and automatic approvals.

- **Trigger:** User runs "tracist install" and authenticates; the persistent daemon then receives server queue messages.

- **Impact:** A compromised or abusive Tracist service/token could cause local agent actions with broad filesystem and command capability.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, README.md, bin/tracist.js, scripts/capture-resume-multiturn.js, lib/acp-client.js, tools/secret-redaction.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-08-09T20:10:45.155Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Authenticated remote queue controls local AI-agent execution.

- **Rationale:** This is an overt, authenticated product feature rather than stealth install-time malware, but it grants a remote service unusually broad control over local AI agents. Warn rather than block because persistence is explicit-user-command and no unconsented lifecycle mutation or covert exfiltration was found.

- **Files touched:** bin/tracist.js, scripts/capture-resume-multiturn.js, lib/acp-client.js, tools/secret-redaction.js

- **Network endpoints:** https://tracist.dev, wss://tracist.dev/api/transcripts/machines/\<machineId\>/socket, https://tracist.dev/api/transcripts/queue/attachments/\<attachmentKey\>

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 93.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for warning:** scripts/capture-resume-multiturn.js accepts authenticated queue messages and dispatches prompts to local agent sessions., It starts/resumes Codex with sandbox "danger-full-access" and approvalPolicy "never"., The explicit install command creates a persistent user daemon that maintains the remote WebSocket control channel., Queued attachments are downloaded from the service and written locally before being included in agent prompts.

- **Evidence against:** package.json has only a prepare build hook; no preinstall/install/postinstall runtime hook., bin/tracist.js requires an explicit "tracist install" command before creating the daemon., Transcript uploads are declared functionality and outbound transcript rows pass through tools/secret-redaction.js., No hidden endpoint, credential harvesting, or foreign AI-agent configuration mutation was found.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to tracist@0.0.60.

- Review the evidence and your use of tracist@0.0.60 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 2. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 3. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** bin/tracist.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/tracist@0.0.60/bin/tracist.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L7: const readline = require("node:readline/promises");
L8: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("node:child_process");
L9: const WebSocket = require("ws");
```

### 4. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** bin/tracist.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/tracist@0.0.60/bin/tracist.js>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: "use strict";
L3: const fs = require("node:fs");
L4: const crypto = require("node:crypto");
```

### 5. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 6. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 7. Medium: Install Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** bin/tracist.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/tracist@0.0.60/bin/tracist.js>)

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L7: const readline = require("node:readline/promises");
L8: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("node:child_process");
L9: const WebSocket = require("ws");
L10: const {
...
L19: const { formatCompactTimestamp: formatSessionActivityDate } = require("../shared/compact-timestamp.js");
L20: const packageRoot = path.resolve(__dirname, "..");
L21: const pkg = require(path.join(packageRoot, "package.json"));
L22: const uploader = require(path.join(packageRoot, "scripts", "capture-resume-multiturn.js"));
...
L45: const home = os.homedir();
L46: const configBase = process.env.TRACIST_CONFIG_DIR || (process.platform === "win32" ? process.env.APPDATA || path.join(home, "AppData", "Roaming") : process.platform === "darwin" ? ...
L47: const dataBase = process.env.TRACIST_DATA_DIR || (process.platform
```

### 8. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 9. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** scripts/capture-resume-multiturn.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/tracist@0.0.60/scripts/capture-resume-multiturn.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L5022: try {
L5023: const zipairOrigin = String(process.env.ZIPAIR_ORIGIN || "http://127.0.0.1:1653").replace(/\/+$/, "");
L5024: const response = spawnSync("curl", [
L5025: "-fsS",
```

### 10. Critical: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** scripts/capture-resume-multiturn.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/tracist@0.0.60/scripts/capture-resume-multiturn.js>)

Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L6: const readline = require("node:readline");
L7: const net = require("node:net");
L8: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("node:child_process");
L9: const { inspectGitRepository } = require("../lib/git-repository.js");
...
L60: function transcriptImageDimensions(bytes, type) {
L61: const buffer = Buffer.isBuffer(bytes) ? bytes : Buffer.from(bytes || []);
L62: if (type === "image/png" && buffer.length >= 24 && buffer.subarray(1, 4).toString() === "PNG") {
...
L200: if (rootResult.status !== 0) return null;
L201: const repositoryRoot = String(rootResult.stdout || "").trim();
L202: if (!repositoryRoot) return null;
...
L236: }
L237: function listWorkingDirectory({ root, relativePath = "", home = os.homedir() }) {
```

### 11. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** scripts/capture-resume-multiturn.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/tracist@0.0.60/scripts/capture-resume-multiturn.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L6: const readline = require("node:readline");
L7: const net = require("node:net");
L8: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("node:child_process");
L9: const { inspectGitRepository } = require("../lib/git-repository.js");
...
L60: function transcriptImageDimensions(bytes, type) {
L61: const buffer = Buffer.isBuffer(bytes) ? bytes : Buffer.from(bytes || []);
L62: if (type === "image/png" && buffer.length >= 24 && buffer.subarray(1, 4).toString() === "PNG") {
...
L200: if (rootResult.status !== 0) return null;
L201: const repositoryRoot = String(rootResult.stdout || "").trim();
L202: if (!repositoryRoot) return null;
...
L236: }
L237: function listWorkingDirectory({ root, relativePath = "", home = os.homedir() }) {
```

### 12. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** bin/tracist.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/tracist@0.0.60/bin/tracist.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> bin/tracist.js
L7: const readline = require("node:readline/promises");
L8: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("node:child_process");
L9: const WebSocket = require("ws");
L10: const {
...
L19: const { formatCompactTimestamp: formatSessionActivityDate } = require("../shared/compact-timestamp.js");
L20: const packageRoot = path.resolve(__dirname, "..");
L21: const pkg = require(path.join(packageRoot, "package.json"));
L22: const uploader = require(path.join(packageRoot, "scripts", "capture-resume-multiturn.js"));
...
L45: const home = os.homedir();
L46: const configBase = process.env.TRACIST_CONFIG_DIR || (process.platform === "win32" ? process.env.APPDATA || path.join(home, "AppData", "Roaming") : process.platform === "darwin" ? ...
L47:
```

### 13. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 14. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 15. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 16. Low: No License
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package manifest does not declare a clear license.

### 17. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** scripts/capture-resume-multiturn.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/tracist@0.0.60/scripts/capture-resume-multiturn.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = tracist@0.0.57
matchedIdentity = npm:dHJhY2lzdA:0.0.57
similarity = 0.800
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepare
- **Dependencies:** 1
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 8
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 1

### Published dependency entries
- ws ^8.21.1 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** tracist
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.0.60
- **License:** UNLICENSED
- **Version published:** 2026-08-05T12:42:29.032Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-05T10:11:42.059Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-08-09T20:27:34.963Z
- **Known versions:** 31
- **Latest version:** 0.0.92
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Upload and continuously stream local AI coding transcripts to Tracist
- **Maintainers:** antimatter15
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18
- **Artifact files:** 17
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 567,814 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/tracist/v/0.0.60>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/antimatter15/tracist>)
- [Homepage](<https://tracist.dev/>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/antimatter15/tracist/issues>)