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transcript-summary-skill@1.0.1: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / transcript-summary-skill / 1.0.1

transcript-summary-skill@1.0.1

Install the transcript-summary agent skill for Grok, Claude Code, Copilot, Gemini CLI, and Codex.

AI Security Review

scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Automatic installation modifies six vendor-neutral or vendor-specific AI-agent skill locations in the user's home directory. It replaces any existing skill with the same name without an explicit user setup command.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm postinstall

Impact

Adds package-controlled instructions to multiple AI-agent control surfaces and overwrites prior same-named skills.

Mechanism

Recursive replacement and copying into AI-agent skill directories

Policy narrative

Installing the npm package automatically runs cli.js. With no arguments, the code selects six agent platforms, deletes any existing transcript-summary skill folder in each home-directory control surface, and copies the package into those locations. This is unconsented install-time mutation of broad AI-agent control surfaces.

AI rationale

The postinstall hook automatically and destructively installs a skill across multiple unrelated AI-agent directories. This meets the install-control-surface blocking policy despite no observed credential theft.

Evidence

package.jsoncli.js$HOME/.grok/skills/transcript-summary$HOME/.claude/skills/transcript-summary$HOME/.copilot/skills/transcript-summary$HOME/.gemini/skills/transcript-summary$HOME/.codex/skills/transcript-summary$HOME/.agents/skills/transcript-summary

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node cli.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

cli.jsView file

22grok: path.join(HOME, ".grok", "skills", NAME), L23: claude: path.join(HOME, ".claude", "skills", NAME), L24: copilot: path.join(HOME, ".copilot", "skills", NAME), L25: gemini: path.join(HOME, ".gemini", "skills", NAME), L26: openai: path.join(HOME, ".codex", "skills", NAME), L27: codex: path.join(HOME, ".codex", "skills", NAME), L28: agents: path.join(HOME, ".agents", "skills", NAME), L29: }; ... L43: fs.rmSync(dest, { recursive: true, force: true }); L44: fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(dest), { recursive: true }); L45: fs.cpSync(src, dest, { L46: recursive: true,

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

cli.jsView on unpkg · L22

7const path = require("path"); L8: const { spawnSync } = require("child_process"); L9: const { pipeline } = require("stream/promises");

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

cli.jsView on unpkg · L7

4const fs = require("fs"); L5: const https = require("https"); L6: const os = require("os"); L7: const path = require("path"); L8: const { spawnSync } = require("child_process"); L9: const { pipeline } = require("stream/promises"); ... L12: const REPO = "saimakramai11/Ai11-Transcript-Summary-Skill"; L13: const REF = process.env.TRANSCRIPT_SUMMARY_REF || "develop"; L14: const HOME = process.env.USERPROFILE || process.env.HOME;

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

cli.jsView on unpkg · L4

4const fs = require("fs"); L5: const https = require("https"); L6: const os = require("os"); L7: const path = require("path"); L8: const { spawnSync } = require("child_process"); L9: const { pipeline } = require("stream/promises"); ... L12: const REPO = "saimakramai11/Ai11-Transcript-Summary-Skill"; L13: const REF = process.env.TRANSCRIPT_SUMMARY_REF || "develop"; L14: const HOME = process.env.USERPROFILE || process.env.HOME; ... L71: function extractArchive(archive, destDir) { L72: if (process.platform === "win32") { L73: const ps = spawnSync(

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

cli.jsView on unpkg · L4

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = transcript-summary-skill@1.0.0 matchedPath = cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

cli.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 1760d627b736ed91 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = transcript-summary-skill@1.0.0 matchedPath = cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 4 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

cli.jsView on unpkg

install.shView file

•path = install.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 2965 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

install.shView on unpkg