triflux@10.54.0
CLI-first multi-model orchestrator for Claude Code — route tasks to Codex, Antigravity, and Claude
AI Security Review
scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook automatically installs a first-party Codex extension, creating a real lifecycle configuration risk. Its behavior is limited in the inspected path and Codex approval remains required, so this warrants a warning rather than a block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest runs scripts/setup.mjs during postinstall, and the installed package takes the deferred setup path.
- Deferred setup runs the hook setup without an interactive prompt; it registers package-owned Codex session hooks without pre-approving them.
- The hooks record session identifiers and local session metadata; Codex trust hashes are written only when approval is requested.
- The supplied integration targets resolve to local configuration, session-index, and bug-report handling; I found no authenticated account action or credential transfer in those inspected locations.
- The hook remains untrusted until Codex approval, so Codex can prompt before running it.
- The inspected hook records local metadata and contains no network send.
Source & flagged code
25 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgSource file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
bin/tfx-live.mjsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to triflux@10.54.0.
See all versions of triflux for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of triflux@10.54.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.