triflux@10.60.0
CLI-first multi-model orchestrator for Claude Code — route tasks to Codex, Antigravity, and Claude
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic postinstall invokes first-party setup that modifies agent configuration, so this warrants a lifecycle-risk warning. The inspected hook approval path requires user consent, and the source inspected does not establish a concrete malicious action.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs scripts/setup.mjs from an automatic postinstall hook.
- The installed package runs runDeferred during postinstall; setup applies changes to Claude settings and records its package path in the user’s Claude directory.
- Setup also prepares Codex profiles and Gemini profiles when that configuration directory exists.
- Setup registers Codex hooks without trust by default and asks an interactive user before approving them.
- Codex hook approval is deferred in noninteractive setup and requires an explicit interactive choice.
- The inspected setup behavior is first-party configuration for Triflux; no credential exfiltration or unrelated agent-control write was established.
Source & flagged code
25 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references shell execution.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to triflux@10.60.0.
See all versions of triflux for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of triflux@10.60.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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