triflux@10.61.1
CLI-first multi-model orchestrator for Claude Code — route tasks to Codex, Antigravity, and Claude
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall automatically provisions package-owned tooling and agent profiles, creating an agent extension lifecycle risk. The inspected sources do not show unconsented mutation of a foreign control surface or another concrete attack, so this warrants a warning rather than a publish block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json defines a postinstall hook that runs scripts/setup.mjs.
- For an installed package, scripts/setup.mjs proceeds to runDeferred during postinstall.
- Setup syncs package files to destination paths and automatically adjusts Codex profiles and profiles in an existing Gemini configuration directory.
- The inspected integration locations use per-user Claude and Codex state paths and the package’s own route helper; they do not establish a separate attack.
- Installation or update of the additional Claude mods plugin requires an explicit flag or interactive consent.
- The inspected setup behavior concerns this package’s own tooling and agent configuration; these sources show no credential exfiltration or unrelated payload execution.
- The extra Claude mods plugin installation is consent-gated.
Source & flagged code
25 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references shell execution.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to triflux@10.61.1.
See all versions of triflux for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of triflux@10.61.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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