triflux@10.79.0
CLI-first multi-model orchestrator for Claude Code — route tasks to Codex, Antigravity, and Claude
AI Security Review
scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall performs first-party agent skill setup, and the user-invoked session launcher bypasses folder-trust confirmation by default. These behaviors warrant a warning; the source does not establish a concrete malicious attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The npm postinstall runs setup, which syncs bundled Markdown skills into the user's Claude skills directory; npm setup cannot prompt for consent.
- Setup also launches a local MCP inventory helper that writes a cache.
- When a user starts a session and a Claude or Codex folder-trust prompt appears, the launcher selects the trust option and sends Enter.
- The `--no-auto-trust` option makes recognized trust prompts block readiness; the package's skill documentation describes the default and this opt-out.
- The other cited agent-integration locations resolve to local configuration, cache, session-index, and route-script paths.
- The runtime-operation hints concern handoff display and text sanitization.
Source & flagged code
25 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references shell execution.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to triflux@10.79.0.
See all versions of triflux for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of triflux@10.79.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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