triflux@10.81.0
CLI-first multi-model orchestrator for Claude Code — route tasks to Codex, Antigravity, and Claude
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection confirms automatic postinstall setup of user-level agent integrations and Codex configuration, which warrants a warning for first-party extension lifecycle risk. The inspected code does not establish credential theft, private-content telemetry, or another concrete attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs scripts/setup.mjs automatically during postinstall.
- For registry installs, the postinstall path runs the full setup routine; repository checkout postinstalls take a message-only branch.
- Setup copies package-managed files to user configuration locations and writes managed Codex configuration.
- Setup has a consent step for optional installations and Codex hook approval, but the broader configuration setup runs without that consent step.
- The inspected setup code manages first-party package files and Codex profiles; these excerpts do not show private prompt or response collection.
- The setup code gates optional installations and Codex hook approval on user consent.
Source & flagged code
25 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references shell execution.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to triflux@10.81.0.
See all versions of triflux for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of triflux@10.81.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.