ts-lint-builders-v2.1@2.1.0

On `npm install`, the package's postinstall hook (`node test.js`) executes a multi-stage attack against the installer. (1) It recursively scans the current working directory for files matching `id.json` (Solana keypair files), `config.toml`/`Config.toml`, `.env`, and `env`, and POSTs each match with the OS username to https://datasecure-service.vercel.app/api/v1. (2) It fetches an attacker-controlled pattern list from https://datasecure-service.vercel.app/api/scan-patterns, then enumerates the user's home directory on Unix (and non-C drives plus C:\Users on Windows via `wmic logicaldisk get name`), bulk-uploading matched files via multipart form to https://datasecure-service.vercel.app/api. (3) On Linux, it retrieves an SSH public key from https://datasecure-service.vercel.app/api/ssh-key, appends it to `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, and runs `sudo chown` plus `sudo ufw enable` and `sudo ufw allow 22/tcp` to ensure inbound SSH access — establishing persistent attacker access. The package name impersonates lint tooling but implements no linter functionality, and declares Node built-ins `child_process` and `os` as npm dependencies — typosquat lures pulling additional registry packages. This is a credential-stealer + persistent backdoor that fires automatically on install. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f7a4f3654ba773deb07e8be2bbb938a4738587d26a4950da06e84b96f1925f33) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.