registry / Credential exfiltration / ts-prorm-orm / 4.4.0

ts-prorm-orm@4.4.0

A TypeScript ORM for MySQL, PostgreSQL, SQLite, MSSQL, and more

AI Security Review

scanned 21h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Source inspection confirms that CLI login transfers dashboard credentials to a hard-coded default host that differs from the package's documented login host, with no destination restriction. This supports blocking for credential exfiltration despite the user-invoked login trigger.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Running `orm-cli auth login` with a token, or completing the browser authorization flow, triggers a token-bearing request.

Impact

The default recipient can receive dashboard credentials intended for the package's login service.

Mechanism

Login completion sends the token to the API whoami route. The API client constructs requests from the configured base URL and adds the token as a bearer credential without a destination allowlist.

Attack narrative

The CLI's default API host is docs-next-alpha.vercel.app, while its documented login example uses app.prorm.dev. During login, the CLI sends the access token to the whoami route through a request client that uses the configured base URL and attaches a bearer token. The source provides no check that the default recipient is the intended login service.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsondist/cli/commands/auth.jsdist/cli/cloud.js

Network endpoints2

docs-next-alpha.vercel.appapp.prorm.dev

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Malicious at 92.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

The package gives app.prorm.dev as its CLI login API example and lists prod-orm.io as its homepage.
The CLI defaults its API destination to docs-next-alpha.vercel.app.
The user-invoked login flow accepts an access token and passes it to the login completion function; the same flow also obtains tokens through browser authorization.
Login completion sends the token to the API, whose request code builds the destination from the configured API URL and attaches the token as a bearer credential.

Evidence against

The transfer occurs during an explicit CLI login command, and the API URL can be overridden; the source does not explain why the default host differs from the documented login host.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

dist/cli/commands/db.jsView file

Lines 53-93javascript

53 // Validate discrete connection parts client-side when no --url is given

54 // (sqlite/file dialects don't need a host, only a database/path).

55 if (!url) {

56 const needsHost = dialect !== 'sqlite';

57 const missing = [];

58 if (needsHost && !host)

59 missing.push('--host');

60 if (needsHost && port === undefined)

61 missing.push('--port');

62 if (!database)

63 missing.push('--database');

64 if (missing.length) {

65 framework_1.out.error(`Missing ${missing.join(', ')} (or pass --url for a full connection string).`);

66 return 1;

67 }

68 }

69 // Prompt for the password without leaking it into shell history when

70 // --password is given without a value.

71 let password = str(ctx.flags.password);

72 if (ctx.flags.password !== undefined && !password) {

73 password = await (0, prompt_1.promptHidden)('Database password: ') || undefined;

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

dist/cli/commands/db.jsView on unpkg · L73

74 }

75 const body = {

76 name: ctx.flags.name,

77 dialect,

78 host,

79 port,

80 database,

81 username: str(ctx.flags.username),

82 password,

83 url,

84 team: str(ctx.flags.team),

85 ssl: ctx.flags.ssl !== false,

86 };

87 const data = await (0, cloud_1.api)('/api/dashboard/databases', { method: 'POST', body });

88 framework_1.out.success(`Connected database ${data.name} (${data.id})`);

89 return 0;

90 },

91});

92const list = (0, framework_1.defineCommand)({

93 name: 'db list',

dist/schema-types.jsView file

Lines 11-51javascript

11 * actually need — adding a value to a live enum.

12 *

13 * Values reaching SQL here are literals, not identifiers: an enum's members, a

14 * comment's text, a domain's default. Each goes through {@link quoteLiteral}

15 * rather than being interpolated.

dist/cli/io.jsView file

Lines 50-90javascript

50const framework_1 = require("./framework");

51const prompt_1 = require("./prompt");

52// ─── Overwrite protection ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────

53/**

54 * Guard a local write: if `dest` already exists, confirm before clobbering it.

dist/cli/commands/packages.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 47

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/cli/commands/packages.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source

dist/cli/commands/db.jsView file

73patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 73

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

dist/cli/commands/db.jsView on unpkg · L73

dist/schema-types.jsView file

31exports.buildNextSequenceValueSQL = buildNextSequenceValueSQL; L32: const schema_objects_1 = require("./schema-objects"); L33: /**

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/schema-types.jsView on unpkg · L31

dist/cli/io.jsView file

70const stream = fs.createReadStream(filePath); L71: const res = await fetch(url, { L72: method: 'PUT', L73: // Node's fetch (undici) requires duplex for a stream body. L74: body: stream_1.Readable.toWeb(stream), L75: duplex: 'half', ... L87: if (!res.body) { L88: fs.writeFileSync(dest, Buffer.from(await res.arrayBuffer())); L89: return; ... L160: const g = (0, framework_1.getGlobalOptions)(); L161: const active = Boolean(process.stderr.isTTY) && !g.quiet && !g.json; L162: if (!active) {

Findings

2 Critical2 High5 Medium6 Low

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/cli/io.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/cli/io.js

HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/cli/io.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/cli/commands/packages.js#virtual:normalized:round1

MediumSecret Patterndist/cli/commands/db.js

MediumDynamic Requiredist/schema-types.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowEval

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to ts-prorm-orm@4.4.0.

See all versions of ts-prorm-orm for other recorded verdicts.

Avoid installing ts-prorm-orm@4.4.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-22 06:28:00.743Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Related packages

Other credential exfiltration packages

Behavioral surface

Related packages

Other credential exfiltration packages

Source & flagged code