type-context@3.2.11

The package presents itself as a logger (module.exports.pino, keywords fast/logger/stream/json, pino-like sibling files proto.js/multistream.js/transport.js/redaction.js) despite being named type-context. When a consumer imports the package and invokes its middleware factory, lib/caller.js is executed as a detached Node child process. That script fetches JSON from a hardcoded remote endpoint (https://jsonhosting.com/api/json/fb84ebf4/raw), extracts a 'cookie' field from the response, and passes the value to new Function.constructor('require', s)(require), executing attacker-controlled JavaScript with the real Node require injected — full module-loader privileges on the host. Fallback destinations are base64-encoded in a shadowed local process.env object labeled DEV_API_KEY, decoding to jsonkeeper.com paste URLs (https://jsonkeeper.com/b/XRGF3, https://jsonkeeper.com/b/4NAKK); this obfuscation of network destinations paired with the dynamic-code sink shows intent to evade casual review. The remote body is mutable and hosted on anonymous paste-style infrastructure, so any code the attacker chooses is executed on the installer/host. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e5a69151637bc251e0fa96b452db0d8e78c4e972dc232ad91fe7f94c7b655688) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.