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u-chan-secrets@5.1.0: Clean npm security report (Allow) | LPM Firewall
Allowed — no malicious behavior detected
17 low-signal patterns reviewed and cleared.
AI security reviewscanned on Nov 7, 2026, 20:51 UTC · by lpm-firewall-ai The package has no install-time hook; its only lifecycle script builds before publishing. Persistence is installed by an explicit user command, while the reviewed Discord and GitHub operations are scoped and protected by approval prompts.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
The MCP client starts when invoked; service persistence is set up only when the user runs the install command. Discord and GitHub actions require explicit commands and protected approvals.
Impact
Expected operation is local service management and user-requested login or integration actions; no unrelated collection or unrequested account action was identified.
Mechanism
The client communicates with the local service over IPC. The integrations send scoped requests to their respective APIs using credentials from the user's vault, with approval controls for connection setup and write operations.
Evidence
/Library/Application Support/u-chan-secrets /var/run/u-chan-secrets
Network endpoints2
api.github.com discord.com
public snapshot
Evidence for AI clean decision
The only declared lifecycle hook is prepublishOnly, which builds the package; there is no install hook. The MCP entry point connects a client over IPC and starts the MCP server. macOS persistence is created through the explicit CLI install command. Discord connection approval describes the permitted metadata access and requires separate approval for writes. GitHub connection approval describes read access and says each create operation requires separate protected approval. Behavioral surface
Source Child process · Crypto · Dynamic require · Environment variables · Filesystem · Network
Supply chain High entropy strings · URL strings
Manifest No manifest risk signals triggered.
Scanned 93 files · 459 KB of source
9 external domains referenced
127.0.0.1 api.github.com discord.com example.com example.invalid github.com registry.npmjs.org v3-verification.invalid www.apple.com Findings6 high · 6 medium · 5 low Source & flagged code9 flagged The lines the automated scan flagged. The review checked them and cleared this version.
High Child processCleared
Package source references child process execution.
dist/core/doctor.js View on unpkg · L1 Code excerpt · 2 lines 1 import { execFile } from 'node:child_process' ;
2 const SHELLS = new Set (['node.exe' , 'cmd.exe' , 'powershell.exe' , 'pwsh.exe' , 'conhost.exe' , 'node' , 'sh' , 'bash' ]);
scripts/windows-security/browser-worker.mjs View file High Same file environment network executionCleared
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
scripts/windows-security/browser-worker.mjs View on unpkg · L4 Code excerpt · 8 lines 4 import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'
5 import { createServer } from 'node:http'
6 import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
7 import { execFile, spawn } from 'node:child_process'
8 import { promisify } from 'node:util'
⋯
10 const exec = (execFile), root = path. (process.argv[ ])
scripts/verify-windows-user-boundary.mjs View file High Sandbox evasion gated capabilityCleared
Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.
scripts/verify-windows-user-boundary.mjs View on unpkg · L2 Code excerpt · 11 lines 2 import fs from 'node:fs/promises'
3 import net from 'node:net'
4 import path from 'node:path'
⋯
9
10 if (process.platform !== 'win32' || await defaultAdminCheck ()) throw new Error ('Run from a non-elevated Windows terminal' )
scripts/verify-windows-adversarial.mjs View file High External AI agent control surface mutationCleared
Runtime or CLI source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.
scripts/verify-windows-adversarial.mjs View on unpkg Scanner record · 10 lines Runtime or CLI code links a write operation to an explicit external AI-agent control path:
process.argv[6] === 'matrix'
if (program !== path.join(home, 'program') && !program.startswith(path.resolve(home, '#0 backup') + path.sep)) throw new error('candidate must be in protected backup storage')
const { safecdporigin } = await import('../dist/core/doctor.js')
if (!safecdporigin(endpoint)) throw new error('unsafe fixture endpoint')
const desktophome = matrix ? path.resolve(process.argv[7] ?? '') : undefined
if (matrix && (!desktophome.startswith(path.resolve(os.tmpdir(), 'u-chan-v5-matrix-' + runidargument) + path.sep) || !['chrome','edge'].includes(path.basename(desktophome)))) throw new error('unsafe disposable desktop home')
let registered = false
try {
await fs.
Medium Ships build helperCleared
Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
scripts/login-bw.bat View on unpkg Scanner record · 4 lines path = scripts/login-bw.bat
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 539
magicHex = [redacted]
High Previous version dangerous deltaCleared
This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/cli.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 5 lines matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = u-chan-secrets@5.0.0
matchedIdentity = npm:dS1jaGFuLXNlY3JldHM:5.0.0
similarity = 0.736
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
Trigger reachable persistence
Code↓ Cleared
Package metadata 8 findings
Medium Network Cleared
Medium Environment variables Cleared
Medium Structural risk force deep review Cleared
Low Non install lifecycle scripts Cleared
Low Scripts present Cleared
Low High entropy strings Cleared
promisify
resolve
2
11 const home = path.join (process.env.ProgramData ?? 'C:\\ProgramData' , 'u-chan-secrets' )
12 if (!root.startsWith (path.resolve (home, '#0 backup' ) + path.sep)) throw new Error ('Unsafe fixture path' )
Medium Dynamic requireCleared
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
scripts/windows-security/browser-worker.mjs View on unpkg · L16 Code excerpt · 3 lines 16 const result = { ok: false }, started = Date.now ()
17 const load = relative => import (pathToFileURL (path.join (program, relative)).href)
18 const { stdout: identity } = await exec ('whoami.exe' , ['/user' ], { windowsHide: true })
13 const { stdout, stderr } = await execFileAsync (cmd, args);
14 return { stdout: stdout.toString (), stderr: stderr.toString (), exitCode: 0 };
66 const env = deps?.env ?? process.env;
67 const out = deps?.out ?? console.log;
79 const pkg = JSON.parse (await fs.readFile (new URL ('../../../package.json' , import .meta.url), 'utf8' ));
80 await assertCompatibleState (homeDir, Number (String (pkg.version).split ('.' )[0 ]));
11 const home = path.join (process.env.ProgramData ?? 'C:\\ProgramData' , 'u-chan-secrets' )
12 const targets = ['settings.json' , 'allowlist.json' , 'audit.log' , 'bin/node.exe' , 'bin/bw.exe' , 'bin/prompt-helper.exe' , 'bin/service-host.exe' , 'bin/service-target.txt' , 'program/p...
40 const finish = r => { clearTimeout (timer); socket.destroy (); resolve (r) }
41 socket.on ('connect' , () => socket.write (JSON.stringify ({ id: 1 , method: 'request_allow' , params }) + '\n' ))
42 socket.on ('data' , chunk => { for (const frame of reader.p