unified-ui-components-library@10.0.2

On `npm install`, the package's postinstall.js collects `os.hostname()` and `os.userInfo().username` and embeds them as query-string parameters in a plaintext HTTP GET to a hardcoded bare IP (http://161.97.149.48/skybackground.png?display=<hostname>&profile=<username>). The fetch is dressed up as an 'image download' but the identifying data is in the URL the server logs, giving the operator a per-install fingerprint of every machine that installs the package. The download path also follows 301/302 redirects to attacker-chosen Locations and writes the server's response body to./downloaded-image.jpg with no content-type validation, providing staging infrastructure alongside the beacon. Cover-story signals corroborate intent: package.json describes an 'image downloader CLI' with placeholder author 'Your Name', README.md advertises an unrelated 'Simple Text Utils' API (capitalize/reverse/wordCount) that the code does not implement, and index.js exports only `downloadImage`. The advertised purpose, README, and shipped code disagree — the consistent behavior across all three is the install-time phone-home. ## Source: ghsa-malware (32a71bf0eee8d7fd2046101d3e1aea109e28f965a3ec4ddcdf9627dd1aecf5a4) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.